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The Three-Systems Ladder of First
Amendment Values: Two Rungs and
a Black Hole
By JAMES G. POPE*
A Black Hole is a region of space ... into which matter has
fallen, and from which nothing ... can escape .... In the vi-
cinity of a Black Hole, and even more so inside one, conditions
become so strange that to describe them in everyday language is
wellnigh impossible. Our common sense notions and our cher-
ished scientific laws take a very heavy beating, and right in the
centre of a Black Hole they cease to have any meaning at all.'
The Burger Court's First Amendment decisions concerning com-
mercial speech, labor picketing, and political expenditures point to-
ward a return to the free enterprise values of the Lochner era.2 Yet, the
Burger Court has continued the Warren Court's vigorous protection of
civil rights protests--even where such protection clashes with free en-
terprise values.' This dichotomy is revealed most clearly in cases in-
volving arguably economic restrictions-such as boycott prohibitions,
* A.B., 1974, Harvard University; J.D., 1983, Harvard Law School. The author
wishes to give special thanks to Richard D. Parker, Laurence H. Tribe, Barbara K. Marks
and Lawrence I. Marks for their support and encouragement.
1. .NIcoLsON & P. MOORE, BLACK HOLES IN SPACE 6-7 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Dorsen & Gora, Free Speech, Property, andthe Burger
Court: Old Values, New Balances, 1982 SuP. CT. Rnv. 195; Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial
Speecd" Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979); Wright,
Money and the Pollution fPolitics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?
82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982); Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enter-
prise Values in the Doctrine ofFree Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982). For an overview of the
Lochner era itself, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 434-55 (1978).
3. See, eg., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (state may not
prohibit peaceful boycott of white-owned businesses in protest of racial injustice); Givhan v.
Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (school board's interest in employee
discipline does not justify the discharge of teacher for protesting racial employment
policies).
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campaign spending regulations, and government employee disciplinary
policies-applied to arguably political expression. Such cases force the
Court to choose between free-enterprise values and "uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open"4 political debate.
On reviewing these cases, one's first impression is likely to be that
the Court has abandoned all semblance of judicial neutrality. Indeed,
it appears that the Court's practice could be summed up in three max-
ims: civil rights activists always win; corporations sometimes win; and
unions and employees, except civil rights activists, almost always lose.
For example, while secondary boycott picketing by a civil rights
organization demanding economic justice for blacks has been protected
under the First Amendment,5 secondary boycott picketing by unions
demanding economic justice for workers6 and protesting the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan has not.7 Government employees have been
protected against discharge in retaliation for raising grievances con-
cerning racially discriminatory employment practices,' but not for rais-
ing grievances concerning employment conditions in general.'
Corporate speech may not be restricted solely on the ground that the
speaker is a corporation,10 but labor picketing may be restricted under
statutes that apply only to labor unions, leaving other groups free to
engage in precisely the same activities."1 Unions must, upon request by
dissenting members, refund the portion of dues used for political ex-
pression;12 corporations may expend corporate resources despite share-
holder dissent.1 3 Civil rights organizations have been accorded First
4. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
5. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 209-
18).
6. See NAACP v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980)
(Safeco) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 185-97).
7. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982)
(ILA) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 219-26).
8. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 153-55).
9. See Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 136-57).
10. See First Nat'l Bank v. Beliotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978) (striking down state
statute that prohibited corporations from engaging in advocacy concerning referenda that
did not materially affect their business).
11. Seeinfranote35.
12. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public employees unions must
refund to dissenters the portion of their dues that has been used for political purposes). See
also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (relying on labor
legislation to guarantee similar refunds for certain dissenting private employees, but noting
that constitutional questions of "the utmost gravity" lurked in the background).
13. See Bellott, 435 U.S. at 792-95; see also Brudney, supra note 2, at 256 n.77.
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Amendment protection against anti-communist affidavit require-
ments;' 4 labor unions have not. 5 Civil rights organizations have been
permitted to conduct sit-in protests against private business practices
on private property; 16 labor unions have not.'7
This Article explores the doctrinal structure underlying this pat-
tern of results. It seeks to identify the areas of stress where the clash of
values is at its sharpest, and the areas of settled law where the conflict is
muted by relatively impartial and determinate doctrine. Part I suggests
that the Court has divided social reality into three systems-the system
of representative government, the commercial market, and the system
of labor relations. Speech is afforded constitutional protection accord-
ing to its role in the functioning of these three systems. On the ladder
of First Amendment values, political speech occupies the top rung,
commercial speech rests on the rung below, and labor speech is rele-
gated to a "black hole" beneath the ladder. Part II surveys the bounda-
ries of the three systems and suggests that, in spite of conflicting signals
from the Court, the cases can be rationalized according to four simple
propositions. Part III assesses the three-systems ladder in light of the
now-dominant functional view of the First Amendment. 8 The Article
concludes that by granting constitutional protection to some rights of
14. See Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (striking down state law that re-
quired "non-trading associations" to file an affidavit stating that none of the officers of any
out-of-state organizations with which they were affiliated were members of a communist or
subversive organization).
15. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (upholding
provision of the NLRA which required all union officers to submit anti-communist affidavits
before their unions gained the benefits of certain provisions of the Act).
16. In a series of cases, the Court managed to provide such protection to civil rights
activists without squarely addressing the First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Garner v. Loui-
siana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 198-203); see generally H.
KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 123-72 (1966).
17. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (state may
prohibit employees from occupying factory in protest against their employer's unlawful anti-
union activities).
18. The functional view, or process theory, of the First Amendment is grounded in the
famous Carolene Products footnote. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). Originated by Alexander Meiklejohn, this theory has since been system-
ized and perfected by John Hart Ely and Jesse Choper. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). Under this view, the Constitution erects a system of
representative democracy. As long as the political process functions smoothly, the Court-
an unelected and thus "anti-majoritarian" branch of government--should refrain from
thwarting the will of the majority as expressed in the actions of the legislative and executive
branches. The principal function of judicial review is to insure that the process operates
consistently with constitutional norms.
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economic expression the Court has ventured onto a slippery slope to-
ward general fights of economic participation.
I. The Three-Systems Ladder
The idea of content neutrality in First Amendment analysis lives
on, 9 but by now it should be clear that the Supreme Court has estab-
lished a "hierarchy of first amendment values" 20 among various types
of protected speech.2' "Public" speech has more value than "private"
speech and "political" speech more than "economic" or "commerciar'
speech. "Labor" speech, though not explicitly recognized as a separate
category, in practice sits at the bottom.22 The hierarchy may be de-
picted as a ladder with two rungs straddling a "black hole." Each level
of this three-level structure corresponds to a central institution in our
society: the top rung to the system of representative government, the
second rung to the commercial market,23 and the black hole to the sys-
19. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 672: "Within the sphere of protected speech, the
Supreme Court has ordinarily called all expression equal, labeling no individual or class of
expression as more or less valuable than any other and regarding all as deserving the same
first amendment protection." In his forthcoming book, Professor Tribe recognizes that this
generalization has been eroded by recent Supreme Court decisions, but maintains that it still
functions as the basic norm. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 194 (Harv. U. Press,
forthcoming). See also Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
RPv. 1, 19 (First Amendment prohibits weighing the social utility of speech); Karst, Equality
as a Central Princole in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 29-35 (1975) (all speech
must be subjected to the same test).
20. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
21. In recent years the Court has, as a matter of course, assessed the value of protected
expression prior to considering the government's interest in suppression. See, e.g., Connic
103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983); ILA, 456 U.S. 212.(1982); Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Safeco, 447
U.S. 607 (1980); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). These cases are dis-
cussed in part II of this Article. Intermediate levels of protection have been accorded "com-
mercial" speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and "offensive" speech, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978) (plurality opinion).
22. "Public" speech may be defined roughly as speech other than "economic" speech.
Generally, "economic" speech is "commercial" plus "labor" speech. "Private" speech is
roughly synonomous with "economic" speech. More precise doctrinal definitions of "polit-
ical," "commercial," and "labor" speech are developed in part II of this Article. For now, it
should be sufficient to keep the following intuitive definitions in mind: "political" speech is
speech concerning public policies or the operation of government; "commercial" speech is
speech, other than labor speech, that concerns solely the economic interests of the speaker,
"labor" speech is speech by employers or employees concerning labor relations or conditions
in the workplace. The imprecise and overlapping character of these definitions poses one of
the doctrinal problems addressed by this Article.
23. The term "commercial market" as used here includes all market interactions other
than labor relations.
Winter 19841 FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES








(e.g., artistic & scientific)
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
LABOR SPEECH lI.,
tern of labor relations.24 Speech essential to the functioning of the
political system receives the highest level of protection; speech that fa-
cilitates the functioning of the commercial market is at an intermediate
level; and speech relating to the system of labor relations receives virtu-
ally no protection at all.
Speech that is only peripherally related to any of the three sys-
tems-most notably artistic and scientific expression-is accorded a
level of protection higher than commercial speech but lower than polit-
ical speech. To round out the picture, the ladder may be situated be-
tween two areas of nonprotection. To one side the speaker may fall off
the ladder into an explicitly unprotected category of speech; to the
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other side he may fall off into "nonspeech" or conduct.25
The priority of political speech over other types of expression is
now widely endorsed by commentators.26 The Supreme Court, while
rejecting the extreme view that only political speech should be pro-
tected,27 has attached major consequences to the distinction. The clas-
sification of speech as "political" or "public" has been decisive in the
Court's decisions providing protection against libel laws, 28 bar solicita-
tion regulations, 29 prohibitions on group professional practice,30 anti-
trust laws,3' secondary boycott prohibitions,32 government employee
25. In this framework, "offensive" speech clings to the left hand side of the ladder, in
danger of falling off into the unprotected category of obscenity. See infra note 34. Speech
relating to sex could constitute a fourth type of protected speech corresponding to the system
of sexual relations of power, see, e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION (1979), and hence would fall into the general
rubric of the approach suggested here. This Article, however, is limited to types of speech
on the political-economic spectrum.
26. In addition to the works cited supra note 18, see BeVier, The First Amendment and
Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Princple, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299
(1978); Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the
Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41, 51 (1974); Bork, Neutral Princples and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Dean Ely, who has made the most thorough
arguments for special protection of political speech, nevertheless argues that, with narrow
exceptions, all speech should be protected. J. ELY, supra note 18, at 109-16.
27. Alexander Meiklejohn, the premier advocate of special protection for political
speech, has suggested that political speech should be entitled to "absolute" protection, while
other types of expression should not be protected. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. Rnv. 245 (1961). Meiklejohn's definition of "political" speech is
fairly broad, encompassing education, philosophy, science, literature, the arts, and "public
discussions of public issues." Id at 256-57. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM, supra note 18. For a narrower definition of "political" speech see Bork, supra note 26,
at 27-28.
28. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 279-80 (1964) (Criticism of
public officials, unless made with "actual malice" is protected against libel prosecutions in
order to insure that debate on public issues is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.").
29. Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978) (overturning state bar disciplinary
sanction imposed on ACLU for violating solicitation restrictions because, for the ACLU,
"litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a form of political expres-
sion and political association") with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(upholding disciplinary sanction imposed on attorney for violating solicitation restrictions in
connection with contingent fee representation).
30. Compare United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967) (group legal practice protected on the basis of right to associate to gain access to
courts) andNAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (group legal practice protected as means
of political advocacy) with Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 421 U.S. 995
(1975) (prohibition against group medical practice upheld despite First Amendment chal-
lenge based on right to associate).
31. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127
(1961) (railroads' propaganda campaign against trucking industry, otherwise violative of the
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
disciplinary sanctions,33 prohibitions against "offensive" words, 34 and
subject matter restrictions.3 Restraints on political or "public" speech
will be upheld only if they are precisely drawn to serve a compelling
governmental interest.36
It is also widely accepted that commercial speech should be af-
forded less constitutional protection than political speech. Whether
commercial speech should be protected at all, however, is hotly de-
Sherman Act, is protected First Amendment expression because directed at influencing state
legislature).
32. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (state cannot ban secondary boycott by civil rights
group). But see IL4, 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (upholding prohibition on labor union's secondary
boycott under federal labor law). The seeming inconsistency of these two cases is discussed
and explained infra text accompanying notes 227-33.
33. Compare Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (reinstating teacher dis-
charged for publicly criticizing school board policies) with Connick, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983)
(upholding discharge of assistant district attorney for "private" speech connected with pro-
test against employment conditions in office). For a detailed discussion of these and other
cases involving government employees, see infra text accompanying notes 90-160.
34. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (state may not prohibit the display
of the slogan "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket worn in a courthouse) with FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (FCC may restrict the broadcast of "offensive" words such as
"fuck," "shit," and "piss," in a humorous monologue). The Court in Pacca raised numer-
ous other possible grounds for distinction. There is no particular reason, however, to think
that children would be more likely to be exposed to a radio broadcast than to a jacket worn
in a public place. Nor is it probable that Cohar's conviction would have been sustained had
he worn a jacket adorned with "Shit on the Draft" and "Piss on the Draft," as well as "Fuck
the Draft." The breadth of the statute in Cohen was a more persuasive ground of distinc-
tion, but the Court appeared to rely less on the character of the statute than on the character
of the expression.
35. All of the cases in which the Court has stated broad prohibitions against subject
matter discrimination involved discrimination against political speech. See, e.g., Metro-
media, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(Black, J., concurring). But see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding ban against
political speakers but not other speakers appearing on military bases); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding ban on political advertising but not com-
mercial advertising on city-owned buses).
In contrast, the Court has routinely upheld subject matter restrictions on labor speech.
The Taft-Hartley Act, which imposes numerous restrictions on labor speech but not on other
types of speech, has survived repeated challenges. See, e.g., Safeco, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
Furthermore, in only one case has a Justice indicated concern over that fact. See NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers' Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Tree Fruits) (Black, J., concur-
ring). See also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977)
(state may prohibit inmates from advocating prisoners' labor union, and may exclude such
advocacy from bulk mailings to inmates from outside sources). Cf. DeGregory v. Giesling,
427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977) (upholding ban on labor picketing but not other picketing
in residential areas).
36. See Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 540; Bellotti 435 U.S. at 786; Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
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bated.3" Initially, the Court advanced justifications for protection re-
lated to the functioning of both the political 38 and commercial 9
systems. However, it has since retreated from the political
rationalization.40
Under the Court's current test, commercial speech that is not mis-
leading and does not propose an unlawful transaction can be regulated
only if the restriction is no broader than necessary to promote a sub-
stantial state interest.41 Several recent decisions striking down restric-
tions on commercial speech demonstrate that this test has a critical
bite.42
Approaching the "black hole" of labor relations, things get fuzzy.
The Court has not developed an explicit test for assessing the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on labor speech. Nevertheless, cases involving
such restrictions reveal a unique, albeit perplexing, approach. Not only
is labor speech accorded less protection than other economic expres-
37. Compare, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REv. 1 (1970) (commercial speech should not be protected) with Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971) (opposite).
38. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976): "[I]f it [the free flow of commercial information] is indispensable to
the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.
Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to en-
lighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of infor-
mation does not serve that goal." (footnotes ommitted).
39. Id. at 763-65 (free flow of commercial information in a free enterprise economy
helps consumers to make efficient use of their dollars, and thereby fosters overall allocative
efficiency).
40. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2880-81 (1983)
(advertising that "links a product to a current public debate" does not thereby gain the
protection generally afforded noncommercial speech); Central Hudson v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5 (1980) (same). See generally Jackson & Jeffries, supranote 2,
at 14-32 (arguing that the Court's protection of commercial speech is grounded solely in the
free enterprise values associated with the Lochner period).
However, it should be noted that in Bolger, the Court reneged on its rejection of the
political rationalization and considered the fact that the expression in question (materials
related to contraception) conveyed truthful information about "important social issues."
103 S. Ct. at 2882.
41. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Thus, it has been observed that "[o]nly the
uncertain difference between 'substantial' and 'compelling' now distinguishes the First
Amendment standard for most commercial advertising from the First Amendment standard
for explicitly political speech." See Note, supra note 2, at 950.
42. See, e.g., Bolger, 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983) (overturning state statute that banned the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)
(overturning state rule of court that banned lawyers from advertising certain nonmisleading
information); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571-72 (overturning state regulation that banned
utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity).
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sion,43 but expression with political content or purpose, normally enti-
tled to the highest level of protection, may be sucked into the black
hole when spoken by labor unions or workers. While the Court sees
the distinction between political and commercial speech as one of
"common sense,"44 it finds that political and labor speech cannot be
separated because "almost every issue can be viewed by some as polit-
ical."45 And, when in doubt, the Court treats borderline expression as
labor speech.'
The characterization of the labor sphere as a "black hole" is par-
ticularly clear in cases dealing with restrictions on speech under the
federal labor laws. Rules that prevail outside the labor sphere are
strangely reversed. Instead of adjusting its analysis of the labor law to
avoid infringing constitutional rights, the Court adjusts its constitu-
tional analysis to avoid upsetting the labor laws' "delicate balance" be-
tween union free speech interests and business economic interests.47
43. See Note, supra note 2, at 941-50. The author argues that since the 1940's, the Court
has reversed the relative status of commercial advertising and labor picketing. In support of
this argument, compare the 1940's cases of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)
("the Constitution imposes no. . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising") and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940) (labor picketing is a pro-
tected means of discussing "matters of public interest") with CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566
(truthful advertising of lawful commercial activity may be restricted only if the restriction is
no broader than necessary to promote a substantial state interest) and Safeco, 447 U.S. at
616 (upholding injunction against peaceful labor picketing apparently on the ground that
labor picketing is inherently coercive).
44. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56.
45. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 570 n.20 (1978). In Eastex, a union distributed
a newsletter on company property. The newsletter urged workers to lobby against a right-
to-work law, criticized a presidential veto of an increase in the federal minimum wage, and
urged workers to register to vote to "defeat our enemies and elect our friends." Id. at 569-
70. The Court rejected the employer's argument that the newsletter was "political," and
thus beyond the scope of the labor law. Instead, it deferred to the Board's judgment that the
newsletter bore a sufficient relation to the employees' economic interests to come under the
protection of the labor law. Id Cf. id at 583 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the
contrast between the Court's concern with the difficulty of separating political speech from
other speech in Eastex and its assurance in Ohralik that common-sense distinctions could be
drawn between political and commercial speech). See generally Hyde, Economic Labor
Law v. Political Labor Relations: Dilemmasfor LiberalLegalism, 60 TEx. L. Rv. 1, 6 (1981).
46. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058
(1984) (public employees' efforts to petition public officials concerning broad issues of public
policy treated as labor expression) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-52); IL,4,
456 U.S. 212, 225-27 (1982) (union protest against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan treated as
labor speech for purposes of constitutional analysis) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 219-26).
47. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Compare Noerr, 365 U.S.
127 (1961) (Sherman Act must be construed not to prohibit political expression to avoid
conflict with First Amendment values) with IL, 456 U.S. at 225-27 (refusing to exempt
political boycott activities by labor unions from the NLRA's prohibition on secondary boy-
Winter 1984]
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This extraordinary judicial deference is rendered more remarkable by
the fact that Congress' "delicate balance" turns the First Amendment
on its head, valuing and protecting economic expression while leaving
political expression relatively unprotected.a8
Paradoxically, protective labor precedents from the 1930's and
1940's-used to justify constitutional protection for commercial
speech49 and for the economic tactics of civil rights activists°--are for-
gotten in the labor context itself.5' Principles routinely cited in cases
involving the commercial/political distinction are replaced by counter-
principles. For example, the principle that laws which "actually affect"
the exercise of First Amendment rights cannot be sustained merely be-
cause they deal with some evil within the state's legislative compe-
tence52 is replaced with the counterprinciple that an unlawful course of
conduct does not gain immunity from regulation "merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language. . . ." Selective restrictions on expression according to its
subject matter, generally considered suspect,54 are afforded reduced
scrutiny relative to content-neutral restrictions where the object of dis-
crimination is labor speech.5 1 Constitutional issues, dealt with at length
in cases involving political or commercial speech, are dispensed with in
cotts because such a holding would create a "large and undefinable" exception to the statute)
and Eastex, 437 U.S. at 570 n.20 (refusing to exempt political expression from NLRA's pro-
tection of employees' collective bargaining activities in part because "almost every issue can
be viewed by some as political").
48. See Hyde, supra note 45, at 1-11. Hyde suggests this phenomenon is rooted not in
the NLRA itself, but in deeply held assumptions about the narrow economic character of
American labor unions. Id. at 11-14. It should be noted that political activity does not
always go without protection under the labor laws. See, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals,
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1982) (Norris-La Guardia
Act held to bar federal courts from enjoining a union work stoppage in protest against the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan even though the work stoppage was politically motivated);
Eastex, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) (discussed supra note 45).
49. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762-63 (1976) (citing AFL v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941) and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-04 (1940)).
50. See, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
at 102 and Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 501-13 (1939)).
51. The Court failed to cite any of these cases in either of its two recent decisions in-
volving restraints on labor expression under the federal labor law. See ILA, 456 U.S. at 212,
225-27; Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616.
52. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
53. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
54. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 183-84 (comparing the Court's treatment of gen-
eral restrictions on picketing with its treatment of restrictions on labor picketing only). It
should also be noted that Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the only protective
labor picketing decision that still carries any precedential weight, concerned an ordinance
granting municipal authorities discretion to ban all kinds of picketing.
a paragraph or two, or bypassed altogether. 6
In the public sector, conditions are not quite so chaotic. Neverthe-
less, there is a "sucking in" effect. Commentary on public officials and
government operations, speech that falls into even the narrowest con-
tent-based definition of political speech,57 has been treated as virtually
unprotected "private" speech in the government employment context."
Viewpoint discrimination in access to public property and public offi-
cials-normally taboo 59-- has been upheld under a reasonable basis
test where the would-be speaker was a public employee or public em-
ployees' union.6
This Article is primarily concerned with the relationship among
the political, commercial, and labor systems. Yet there is a wide vari-
ety of expression, most notably artistic and scientific expression, that is
at most peripherally related to any of the three systems. This Article
stops short of the claim that all speech is or should be evaluated exclu-
sively with reference to one of the three systems. Protection for artistic
and scientific expression may be justified either with reference to values
of self-government,61 or with reference to noninstrumental values such
as "happiness," "self-fulfillment," or "self-realization. ' 62 The results
and reasoning of the cases are consistent either with the view that
noninstrumental values do justify the protection of such speech, but
that political speech has priority because it is "more than self-expres-
56. In addition to the other labor cases cited in this part, see Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.
v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2926, 2933 (1983); Babbit v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 312-14 (1979); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31
(1974).
57. Robert Bork's definition of political speech, generally considered to be the narrow-
est in the field, includes inter alia, all "criticisms of public officials and policies." Bork, supra
note 26, at 27-28.
58. In Connick, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983), criticisms of public officials and public policies by
an employee were held to constitute "private" expression worthy only of minimal protec-
tion. Id at 1694-95 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-09); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
60. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1074,
1084-85 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-52);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55, 63-66 (1983) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 110-19). But see City of Madison
Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 105-09).
61. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, supra note 27, at 255-57.
62. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 576-79; Baker, Scope ofthe First Amendaent Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 990-1009 (1978); Dworkin, Introduction, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1,
13-16 (1977).
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sion," 63 or with the view that the protection of all speech other than
commercial and labor speech is justified primarily with reference to the
political system, but that some speech is more attenuated in value and
thus merits less protection. It should be emphasized that the Court's
view of the relative value of all kinds of speech can be explained with
reference to the three systems. Indeed, that approach appears to be the
one preferred by the Court.6r
Viewed from the theoretical perspective advanced by Professor
Richard Parker,65 the three-systems ladder may be understood as part
of an attempt by the Court to mediate between two underlying polar
"pictures" of constitutional order. The first, "transcendent" picture,
depicts the essence of constitutional order as derived from the text of
the Constitution or from a system of abstract reasoning "disembodied"
from and superimposed upon the turbulence and strife of everyday life.
The second, "immanent" vision, finds order embodied in the spontane-
ous political life of the community and hence requires little or no
outside enforcement.
66
In Parker's view, the history of constitutional law may be seen as a
series of attempts to mediate between these polar visions.67 The Court
has employed two general strategies of mediation: analysis and synthe-
sis. The analytic strategy divides constitutional issues into two types,
those requiring transcendent intervention, and those which can safely
be left to the spontaneous operation of the political process. The syn-
thetic strategy, in its modem form, posits that the polity generally func-
tions satisfactorily, but recognizes that occasional malfunctions require
judicial intervention.
68
In this light, the three-systems ladder contains both an analytic
and synthetic component. Social reality is analytically divided into
three systems, each with a different position on the transcendent-inma-
63. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
64. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
65. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory--And lts Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223,
224-29 (1981); Parker, Political Vision in Constitutional Argument (1979) (on file at Harvard
University Law Library).
66. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory, supra note 65, at 224-25.
67. Indeed, it would seem that the Court is fated to be torn by this dichotomy, for a true
resolution of the tension between the two polar visions would be inconsistent with the con-
tinued survival of judicial review as an institution. Anything short of outright dictatorship
would leave the transcendent vision incomplete, since there would still be room for sponta-
neous political activity and thus a need to distinguish between situations requiring interven-
tion and situations involving healthy spontaneity. Conversely, judicial review would
become superfluous were the immanent vision to gain a total victory.
68. For a classic example of this strategy applied to the political system, see J. ELY,
supra note 18.
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nent spectrum. Order in the political system is at the transcendent end
of the spectrum and requires a high level of judicial scrutiny and inter-
vention. Order in the labor system is at the opposite, immanent end of
the spectrum and can be safely left to Congress. The commercial sys-
tem lies between these two extremes. Within each sphere, the approach
is synthetic.
Not surprisingly, the doctrinal stresses are focused on the system
boundaries. The relatively open clash of values revealed by the demar-
cation of boundaries makes possible relatively settled adjudication
within. For example, the existence of the "black hole" of labor rela-
tions serves to skew results against workers and unions in both the pub-
lic and private labor sectors, and thus is open to criticism as an
unprincipled judicial attack on workers and unions.69 But the thumb
on the scale is lifted once the boundary of the labor sphere is crossed;
the First Amendment claims of employers and workers alike are swal-
lowed up in the black hole.7" Similarly, the placement of political ex-
penditures and contributions in the sphere of political speech embodies
an apparent bias in favor of the wealthy and corporations. Once the
boundary is fixed, however, unions as well as corporations may invoke
the resulting protection. 7' The same phenomenon is evident all along
the system boundaries.72
II. Demarcating the System Boundaries
The level of constitutional protection accorded particular expres-
sion is determined in part by its identification with one of the three
69. See infra text accompanying notes 242-324. The tilt results from the fact that work-
ers are more likely to seek constitutional protection for expressive activities than are
employers.
70. The leading case on employer speech is NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969). In that case, a company president attempted to convince his employees that they
should vote against union representation because a strike "'could lead to the closing of the
plant.'" Id at 588. The Court upheld the NLRB's ruling that this advocacy constituted an
unfair labor practice. The employer's First Amendment claim was rejected because his
"threat" might unduly influence the employees. Id. at 617-19.
71. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948) (federal law interpreted not
to ban union from soliciting and spending funds for publication of periodical advocating
congressional candidacy because a contrary construction would raise "the gravest doubt"
about the statute's constitutionality).
72. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (extending No-
err, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) [Sherman Act held not to prohibit activities directed at influencing
government] to cover unions as well as corporations); United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (extending NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) [NAACP exempted from state bar solicitation restrictions] to cover unions as well as
civil rights organizations).
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systems. Hence, the technique of classification has emerged as an im-
portant issue in First Amendment adjudication. The Court's complex
attempts to demarcate the system boundaries have been of little assist-
ance. However, the cases do reveal a consistent pattern of results.
This part suggests that the cases can be rationalized according to
four relatively simple propositions. The boundaries of the three sys-
tems are defined in process terms. The definitions focus not on content
or motivation per se, but on the flow of speech into and through a sys-
tem. The four propositions may be stated as follows:
(1) Political speech-i.e., speech that is directed at influencing
governmental institutions through external democratic channels73 -is
entitled to the highest level of protection;
(2) Commercial speech-i.e., speech, other than political or labor
speech, which is directed at influencing market institutions-is entitled
to an intermediate level of protection;
(3) Labor speech-i.e., speech, other than political speech, that is
uttered by employers or employees and directed at influencing employ-
ers or employees-is virtually unprotected;
(4) Speech that raises grievances concerning racial treatment is en-
titled to the highest level of protection regardless of which of the three
systems is involved. This rule may be viewed as a remedy for malfunc-
tions in all three systems, or as an integrated conception of political and
economic life now applied only in the civil rights area.
The boundaries of the three systems are most clearly revealed in
cases involving the First Amendment rights of government employees
and cases involving the use of economic boycotts to influence the polit-
ical process. Before reviewing those cases, it will be useful to survey
briefly the Court's efforts to provide explicit descriptions of the
boundaries.
73. External democratic channels link the components of what have been called the
"exterior" processes of government. J. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 146 (1983).
Those processes include the voters, the legislature, and the outward-looking face of courts
and administrative agencies. Generally, the exterior processes perform the representative
functions of a representative democracy. By contrast, the "autonomous" or "interior"
processes of government are roughly synonymous with the bureaucracy. In the interior
processes, government acts primarily as employer and manager. Id. at 145-56, 151.
By "external democratic channels," I mean to include not only the channels themselves
(e.g., lobbying and voting) but also the expressive and associational activities directed at
influencing people to use them. Further, as will become clear from the analysis below, the
external channels need only be the last link in a chain of interactions. For example, a boy-
cott of privately owned convention facilities designed to pressure indirectly the state legisla-
ture would fall within the realm of political association and expression.
A. The Court's Stated Demarcations
Initially, the Court attempted to state generally applicable, con-
tent-based definitions of political and commercial speech. Political or
public speech was variously defined as speech that concerned "the
manner in which government is operated or should be operated,"74
"persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particu-
lar views on economic, political, or social issues,"7 and as commentary
upon "matters of public interest. 76 Commercial speech was defined as
"speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion,' ,,77 and, much more expansively, as "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."78
All of these definitions conflict with the Court's own practice.
Speech which is clearly "political" or "public" according to any of the
Court's definitions has been afforded no protection when uttered within
the labor relations system.79 Conversely, expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience has been termed
"political" and accorded the highest level of protection.8"
Recently, the Court has employed a flexible, multifactor approach
in classifying particular types of speech. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., ' for example, a drug company mailed out unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives. Most of the mailed materials con-
sisted solely of information concerning products for sale and thus fell
"within the core notion of commercial speech-'speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.' "82 But the mailings also
included pamphlets that combined product descriptions with informa-
74. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
75. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980) (solicitation by environmental protection group was not commercial speech). See
also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980).
76. Pickering v. Board of Educ,, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (advertisement concerning events that occurred
during a civil rights demonstration was not mere commercial speech because it "communi-
cated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives [were]
matters of the highest public interest and concern").
77. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
78. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
79. See, e.g., 1L4, 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (protest against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan);
Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984) (commentary
on broad issues of public educational policy).
80. See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (advertising by railroad interests attacking the
trucking industry).
81. 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983).
82. Id at 2880 (quoting Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
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tion concerning the desirability and availability of contraceptives in
general. In classifying these pamphlets, the Court looked at several
other factors: the overall character of the pamphlets as "advertise-
ments," the mention of specific products, and the drug company's
"economic motivation" for mailing the pamphlets. 3 Although none of
these factors by itself was determinative, the combination of all was
sufficient to indicate the commercial character of the pamphlets.14 The
Court emphasized the flexible character of its approach, disclaiming
any intention to set forth a definitive test or to cover situations other
than the one with which it was presented. 5 Likewise, in Connick v.
Myers,86 the Court considered the "content, form, and context" of a
questionnaire circulated by a government employee among her co-
workers87 before deciding that it was an "employee grievance concern-
ing internal office policy" and thus of limited First Amendment
value .
8
Though the opinions in Bolger and Connick set forth indetermi-
nate multi-factor tests, they do hint at the logic underlying the Court's
approach to the classification of expression. In Bolger, the Court ad-
justed the level of protection to the systemic context. Because the drug
company could separately disseminate its "direct comments on public
issues" with full constitutional protection, the Court concluded that
there was "no reason for providing similar constitutional protection
when such statements are made in the context of commercial transac-
tions."89 This conclusion suggests that expression which is valuable to
the political system need not be given special protection when its con-
tribution to that system is not contingent upon expression in the context
of the commercial marketplace. Thus, systemic context and values, not
content or motivation, are the critical factors.
83. 103 S. Ct. at 2880.
84. Id
85. Bolger, 103 S. Ct. at 2880 n.14.
86. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
87. Id at 1690.
88. Id. at 1693-94.
89. Bolger, 103 S. Ct. at 2881. As noted above, the Court in Connick also considered the
institutional context in classifying speech. See Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. Edwin Baker
suggested a similar approach some years ago. See Baker, supra note 37, at 22-23.
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B. The Three-Systems Ladder in Operation: The Government
Employee Cases 9°
The operation of the Supreme Court's process-oriented demarca-
tions shows up clearly in cases involving the First Amendment rights of
government workers. Prior to the 1960's, public employment was gen-
erally deemed a "privilege" that could be withdrawn at will. 91 For ex-
ample, in Adler v. Board of Education,92 the Court upheld a New York
statute that barred members of "subversive" organizations from public
employment, in part because teachers had "no right to work for the
State ... on their own terms." '93 In a series of cases dealing with loy-
alty requirements, however, the Court gradually ate away at this right-
privilege doctrine.94 Finally, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,95 the
Court effectively reversed Adler and explicitly repudiated the doctrine
as applied to public employment.96
In Pickering v. Board of Education,97 the Court extended Keyishian
to protect expression by public employees. Mr. Pickering was fired
from his position as a high school teacher for writing a letter to the
editor of a local newspaper. The letter criticized the school board for
"totalitarianism" in pressuring teachers to support a bond referendum
and for misallocating funds to athletic rather than academic needs.98
On these facts, the Court determined that Pickering's dismissal violated
the First Amendment.99
90. All of the cases discussed in this section involve "nonpolicymaking" employees of
state or local government. Cases involving federal civil service employees fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367
(1983). Policymaking employees may be discharged at will. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion) (dictum).
91. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, a policeman "may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See generally Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439,
1439-42 (1968). But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state cannot condition
employment on the extraction of an oath denying past affiliation with the Communist
Party).
92. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
93. Id. at 492.
94. The Court reviewed this history in Connick, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1688-89 (1983).
95. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
96. Id at 605-06.
97. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
98. Id at 575-78.
99. Id at 565. The Court held that when a teacher acts as a member of the general
public, "absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment." Id at 574 (footnote omitted).
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The Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, described the prob-
lem as one of arriving at "a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the effi-
ciency of the public services it performs through its employees."'" Be-
cause this test considered only the interests of the teacher as a citizen
(rather than employee), the determination of whether he was acting as
a citizen logically preceded the balancing of the free speech and gov-
ernmental interests. In making this determination, the Court consid-
ered the subject matter and institutional context of the teacher's speech.
It found that the subject matter encompassed "matters of legitimate
public concern"I 0 ' and was only "tangentially and insubstantially" in-
volved with the fact of employment. 0 2 Furthermore, the speech was
directed at the public and not at "any person with whom appellant
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a
teacher."1 3 The Court concluded that the teacher should be regarded
as a member of the general public and that on balance his constitu-
tional rights had been violated by the dismissal. °4
Pickering reveals the concern with the boundary between the polit-
ical and labor relations systems that runs throughout the government
employee cases. The Court's analysis splits the employee and the gov-
ernment institution each into two distinct identities. The employee
may speak either as a "citizen" whose expression is valuable to the
functioning of the political system, or as an "employee" whose expres-
sion threatens the efficiency of government operations. Correspond-
ingly, the government institution may restrict speech either as the voice
of the majority, with no legitimate interest in suppressing individual
expression, or as an employer, with a legitimate interest in promoting
efficiency.
In City of Madison v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
(WERC) °s the Court made it clear that the content of expression was
not decisive in the Pickering analysis: employee speech concerning la-
bor contract negotiations and terms and conditions of employment
would be protected provided the speech was aimed at the political pro-
cess. In WERC, a nonunion teacher was permitted to speak at a public
school board meeting called in the midst of contract negotiations be-
100. Id at 568.
101. Id. at 571.
102. Id. at 574.
103. Id. at 569-70.
104. Id. at 574-75.
105. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
tween the board and a union that was certified under state law as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the teachers in the system. The
teacher questioned the value of a union proposal that would have re-
quired all teachers, whether or not they were members of the union, to
pay an agency fee to the union to defray the costs of bargaining. The
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission determined that the
school board had violated the state's labor law by negotiating directly
with the teacher in derogation of the union's status as exclusive bar-
gaining representative. Accordingly, the Commission ordered the
school board not to permit teachers other than union representatives to
speak at meetings concerning collective bargaining.
At first glance, it appeared that the Commission occupied a strong
legal position. The employment-related content of the expression in
WERC contrasted starkly with the expression in Pickering. Moreover,
in WERC, the state clearly had a strong interest as an employer in pro-
tecting the role of the exclusive bargaining representative in its system
of public employee labor relations.' 6 Nevertheless, the Court over-
turned the Commission's order, holding that the teacher's appearance
before the school board was protected expression under the First
Amendment.10 7 As in Pickering, the reasoning hinged on the value of
expression by the teacher "as a concerned citizen."'0 8 What made his
speech "public," in spite of its employment-related content, was the
fact that the meeting was open to the public and thus constituted a
106. Id. at 178-79 (Brennan, J., concurring). The crucial role of exclusive bargaining
representatives in stabilizing labor relations had been recognized by the Court in cases in-
volving the federal labor laws. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (holding that attempts by minority workers to negotiate
directly with management were not protected under the federal labor laws: "Central to the
policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the employees elect that course, is the princi-
ple of majority rule."); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (employer may not
circumvent the structure of collective bargaining contained in the federal labor law by nego-
tiating individual contracts with employees).
107. WERC, 429 U.S. at 176-77.
108. Id. at 175-76. The Court also relied in part upon the fact that the teacher was not
attempting to negotiate an agreement on the spot, which, in any case, he was not authorized
to do. .d at 174. This consideration, however, merely restates the fact that the union was
the exclusive bargaining representative. The purpose of prohibiting direct talks with indi-
vidual workers is not to prevent the negotiation of an agreement, which would be illegal
anyway. Instead, the purpose is to prevent the undermining of the exclusive bargaining
representative, a result that appears to have occurred in WERC since the school board ac-
ceded to all of the union's demands except for the one challenged by the teacher at the
meeting. Id. at 172. Cf. In re Sam'l Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612 (1948)
(employer may not speak individually with striking workers to urge them to return to work).
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recognized channel for citizens to communicate with government.10 9
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion 1 0 involved issues similar to those in WERC, but came out the
other way. There, a school board negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement that permitted a teachers' union to circulate its notices
through the school mailbox system. A rival union was denied access.
The favored union had been certified as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for the teachers in the system after an election victory over the
rival union. In addition to the majority union, outside organizations
such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and parochial schools were permitted
to use the mail system.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the selective access policy. As
in WERC, the Court treated the issue partly as a public forum ques-
tion. Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that the mailbox
system was "not by tradition or designation a forum for public commu-
nication." Hence, to pass constitutional muster the restriction only had
to be "reasonable" and not motivated "merely" by opposition to the
speaker's views.1 '
A closer look at the opinion, however, suggests that the citizen-
employee dichotomy was more important to the result than the public
forum analysis. The latter was painfully circular." 2 The Court ac-
knowledged that selective access to forums that were public by state
designation would be subject to strict scrutiny."13 But the school
mailbox system in Perry was not such a forum. Why? Because the
board had granted only selective access."
14
109. WERC, 429 U.S. at 175-77. The Court's reference to the meeting as a public forum
adds nothing to this analysis. Expression concerning terms and conditions of employment
has been suppressed on the basis of content when that expression is not directed to a recog-
nized democratic channel regardless of whether it takes place in a public forum. See gener-
ally Lo Burgio, Federal Employee Picketing: Regulation of a Privilege, 21 A.F. L.R. 330.
(1979).
110. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
111. Id. at 46.
112. See L. TiBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 19.
113. 460 U.S. at 45. In those situations, the government is bound by "the same standards
which apply in a traditional public forum." Thus, content-based restrictions are permitted
only when the state can "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id.
114. "This type of selective access [admission of various civic and church organizations
such as the YMCA and Cub Scouts] does not transform government property into a public
forum." Id at 47. The Court cited Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding ban on
political but not other speakers on military base) and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding ban on political but not other advertising in city-owned buses)
for this proposition. But neither Greer nor Lehman involved a forum whose explicit purpose
was communicative. See L. TIBE, supra note 2, at 690-91. The dissent in Perry vigorously
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Perhaps to mitigate this apparent circularity, the Court suggested
that there was no constitutional problem in discriminating against labor
unions. Even if the mailbox system were a "limited" public forum, ac-
cess for organizations that "engage in activities of interest and educa-
tional relevance to students," like the girl scouts or a local boys' club,
would not open it up to an organization like the minority union that
was "concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher employ-
ment."' 5 This line of reasoning ignored the fact that the board had
opened the mailbox system not only to organizations that engaged in
activities of relevance to students, but also to the majority union, which
was concerned with the terms and conditions of teacher employment.
The climax of the opinion, as far as the "black hole" character of
labor speech is concerned, was the Court's treatment of the apparent
viewpoint discrimination among the two directly competing labor un-
ions." 6 Having found that the exclusive access policy was not moti-
vated by viewpoint discrimination, 1 17 the Court turned around and
determined that it was justifiable in part because "exclusion of the rival
union may reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor-peace
within the schools.""' How the restriction on access accomplished that
end, other than by suppressing the minority union's viewpoint, was left
unexplained.' ' 9 The decision in Perry appears more logical, though not
necessarily defensible, if interpreted to stand for the simple proposition
that attempts to influence governmental labor relations policy are sub-
ject to minimal or no constitutional scrutiny when advanced outside of
external democratic channels.
This proposition was confirmed two months later in Connick v.
criticized the majority's public forum analysis as an irrelevant obfuscation of the underlying
issue relating to viewpoint discrimination. 460 U.S. at 57-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48.
116. Id. at 63-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 48-49.
118. Id at 52. The mere potential for future harm was sufficient. Id But cf. WERC, 429
U.S. at 175-76 (recognizing that discrimination between the views of a majority union and
nonunion employees constitutes viewpoint discrimination). Although viewpoint discrimina-
tion in the labor relations context might be justified in some circumstances, such as during
negotiations or grievance sessions, it certainly should be subjected to the strict scrutiny ap-
plied to other viewpoint discrimination. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 65-66 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
119. The Court also found that the "status" of the majority union as exclusive bargaining
agent was a "reasonable" basis for the differential access provided the two unions. 460 U.S.
at 48-54. But, as the dissent pointed out, the policy was both underinclusive, because it
granted the majority union access for communications unrelated to its status as bargaining
representative, and overinclusive, because outside organizations with no special status en-
joyed access privileges. Id at 66-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Myers, 21 this time without the confusing public forum rhetoric. In
Connick, Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney, was discharged for
circulating a questionnaire to her coworkers. The questionnaire con-
cerned such matters as transfer policy, office morale, the reliability of
certain supervisors, and pressure placed upon employees to engage in
political campaigning for candidates supported by the office. Again by
a 5-4 vote the Court upheld the discharge. 2'
Justice White's majority opinion for the first time laid out the two-
step analysis hinted at in Pickering. First, the Court must determine
whether the worker spoke as a "citizen upon matters of public concern"
or as an "employee upon matters only of personal interest."'' 21 If the
former, then the Pickering balancing test is applied to assess the consti-
tutionality of the discharge. If, however, the worker spoke only on
matters of personal interest, the First Amendment claim is rejected
"absent the most unusual circumstances."'
' 23
The Court's application of this approach in Connick provides an
extraordinarily clear example of judicial assessment of the worth of
speech. Myer's motivation and sincerity were probed and derided.'24
The value of the particular content, both subject matter and viewpoint,
was evaluated. The Court found that the question in Myers's survey
concerning pressure to work on political campaigns implicated a "mat-
ter of public concern" in part because "there is a demonstrated interest
in this country that government service should depend upon meritori-
ous performance rather than political service." 2 5 It is hard to interpret
this statement as indicating anything other than that speech which sup-
ports government policies is entitled to more protection than speech
which criticizes them-a peculiar reversal of First Amendment con-
cerns.'26 The majority's interpretation of precedents was equally prob-
lematic. Justice White ignored WERC in order to support his
formulation of the test as centering on whether the content of the em-
120. 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
121. Id. at 1694. With two exceptions, the alignment of Justices was identical to that in
Perry. Justice White, who dissented in Perry, changed places with Justice Stevens.
122. Id. at 1690.
123. Id. at 1689-90.
124. "[T]he focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but
rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. These
questions reflect one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that
displeasure into a cause celebre." Id. at 1691 (footnote omitted).
125. Id.
126. The First Amendment protects against government suppression of speech. Obvi-
ously, the free speech guarantee would be of little use if it protected only speech that is
consistent with government policy. See id, at 1698 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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ployee's expression involved "matters of public concern."' 127
None of these questionable lines of reasoning, however, were nec-
essary to support the result in Connick. One of the factors considered
by the Court was the internal office setting of Myers's expression.' 28
Under the logic of Pickering and its progeny, the fact that Myers at-
tempted to influence government labor relations policy in such a set-
ting-that is, without going through external democratic channels-
would have been sufficient to support the Court's conclusion that her
expression was entitled only to minimal constitutional protection.
29
The Court's most recent decision concerning the First Amendment
rights of government employees, Minnesota State Boardfor Community
Colleges v. Knight,'30 rounds out the process distinction between polit-
ical and labor speech in the government employee context. It has been
seen that speech aimed at influencing government through external
channels is protected whether it concerns conditions of employment' 3 '
127. "Our cases following Pickering also involved speech on matters of public concern."
103 S. Ct. at 1689 (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979),
Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) and Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). The Court studiously avoided citing WERC, which held
speech on contract negotiations and terms, and conditions of employment to be protected.
The dissent pointed out that a judge's determination of what is and what is not an issue of
public concern involves a "sensitive" inquiry. 103 S. Ct. at 1699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
This point is worth emphasizing because the Court has consistently used the phrase "matters
of public concern" to distinguish between govenment employees' expression as citizens and
as employees. As the Court recognized in WERC, 429 U.S. at 177, almost every issue con-
cerning the operation of a school system could also be characterized as a potential subject of
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the Court recognized in Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691,
that almost all internal office matters could be of public concern. The only interpretation of
the phrase "matters of public concern" which would seem to give it independent meaning-
that it signifies actualpublic concern-was apparently rejected in Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1697
n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (extensive local press coverage indicated that the matter was
actually of public concern).
128. 103 S. Ct. at 1693.
129. Instead, the Court found it necessary to utilize the Pickering balancing test. Al-
though Myers' expression was for the most part of personal interest only, the question on
political pressure touched on a matter of public concern. Applying the balancing test, the
Cotirt held that the state's interest in preventing possible future disruption of the office justi-
fied suppressing expression which was "most accurately characterized as an employee griev-
ance concerning internal office policy." Id at 1693-94. As the dissent pointed out, however,
consideration of the public character of the expression in the balancing stage of the analysis
as well as in the initial stage of determining whether to invoke the analysis effectively
weighed that factor twice. Id at 1695-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
131. See City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (discussed supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text).
See also Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (untenured teacher not
rehired for making critical remarks to a radio station concerning dress code imposed on
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or other issues.132 But, as the decisions in Perry and Connick indicate,
speech aimed at influencing labor relations policy through internal
channels is effectively unprotected. 33 In Knight, the Court extended
Perry and Connick to deny protection to employees who attempted to
influence a broad range of government policies through internal
channels.
Knight involved a challenge to Minnesota's Public Employment
Labor Relations Act (PELRA). PELRA provided for two types of for-
mally organized communication between public workers and their em-
ployers. First, it required public employers to "meet and negotiate"
with exclusive bargaining representatives-that is, majority unions-
concerning "terms and conditions of employment."' 134  Second, it di-
rected employers to "meet and confer" with those exclusive representa-
tives concerning public policy issues not within the scope of the "meet
and negotiate" process. 135 The law prohibited public employers from
engaging in either of the two processes with any employees other than
those selected by the exclusive representatives.
Twenty community college instructors who were not members of
the majority union brought suit to challenge their exclusion from the
two channels of communication. Predictably, their claim involving the
"meet and negotiate" sessions-labor speech under both content and
process definitions-was summarily rejected by a three-judge panel of
teachers would be entitled to reinstatement if the remarks were the "but-for" cause of the
decision not to rehire him).
132. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (discussed supra notes 97-104
and accompanying text). The Court's consistent approval of statutory bans on political
campaigning by public employees, see, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), quali-
fies but does not invalidate this generalization. Those cases may be explained in terms of the
government's interest in preventing an official from compelling employees to work for the
official's re-election. Where that governmental interest is not present, political activities are
protected. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347
(1976).
133. See Perry, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (discussed supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text);
Connick, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (discussed supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text).
134. The state workforce was divided into bargaining units. The employees of each unit
selected their exclusive representative by majority vote. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
PELRA defines "terms and conditions of employment" to include: "the hours of em-
ployment, the compensation therefor including fringe benefits except retirement contribu-
tions or benefits, and the employer's personnel policies affecting the working conditions of
the employees. In the case of professional employees the term does not mean educational
policies of a school district." Id. at 1075.
135. If the employees in a given bargaining unit had selected an exclusive representative
for the "meet and negotiate" process, that representative was also certified for the "meet and
confer" process. Otherwise, the employees could select a representative specifically for the
"meet and confer" process. Id. at 1060-61.
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the district court, and by the Supreme Court itself.'36 On the "meet
and confer" issue, however, the instructors prevailed in the district
court and provoked a barrage of opinions in the Supreme Court.
The "meet and confer" issue forced a showdown between the defi-
nition of political speech based on process and the various definitions
based on content and motivation. 137 The "meet and confer" sessions
had been set up for the express purpose of dealing with issues other
than terms and conditions of employment. Sessions had covered such
topics as school finances, student affairs, and the content of public in-
struction.13 8 Hence, the subject matter of those sessions fell squarely
within the political sphere as defined either by content or by motiva-
tion. Under those definitions, the instructors' rights of free expression
and association, as well as their right to petition the government, were
all affected by restrictions on access to the "meet and confer" sessions.
The Court, however, held that no First Amendment rights were
infringed. 39  Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, framed her
analysis in process terms. The instructors' free speech claims failed be-
cause of the institutional context and target of the expressive and asso-
ciational activities. The instructors could not rely upon public forum
cases like WERC, because the meet and confer sessions were not open
to the public. Nor could they turn to nonpublic forum cases like Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 4° because those cases involved
speech aimed at "private individuals or public officials not acting in an
official capacity"' 4 ' instead of direct communication with public
policymakers as in Knight. In short, both the speakers and listeners in
Knight were participating in the internal processes of government.
Stripped of support from both the public forum and the nonpublic
forum cases, the instructors were left with the bald-faced assertion that
they enjoyed the right "to force officers of the state acting in an official
policymaking capacity to listen to them in a particular formal set-
ting."' 142 The Court easily dispensed with that claim, reasoning that
136. See id. at 1063 (referring to its earlier summary affirmance of the district court judg-
ment [Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Assoc., 571 F. Supp. 1, 3-5 (D.
Minn. 1982)] on that issue).
137. These definitions are set forth supra, text accompanying notes 73-78.
138. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
139. Id at 1068.
140. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance banning all picketing except peaceful labor picketing
within 150 feet of a public school unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of speech
content).
141. Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1065, n.8.
142. Id. at 1065.
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government officials must have the power to choose their advisors.'
43
Accordingly, the instructors' free speech challenge failed.'
44
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens vigorously argued that
because the "meet and confer" provisions of PELRA restricted expres-
sion concerning the full range of public policy, those provisions in-
fringed important First Amendment rights.'4 5 Furthermore, the "meet
and confer" process permitted the majority union to express its own
viewpoint while prohibiting others from doing the same. Thus, Minne-
sota had committed the cardinal sin of engaging in viewpoint dis-
crimination. 146  Though Justice Stevens approved of viewpoint
discrimination where necessary to serve the state's compelling interest
in safeguarding the collective bargaining process, 147 he maintained that
it should be prohibited altogether outside of that limited area.
4
1
With Justice O'Connor's opinion in Knight, the Court has finally
begun to demarcate the system boundaries in explicit process terms.
Her opinion, however, continues to blur those boundaries in important
respects. The two factors she relied upon-the absence of a public fo-
rum and the attempt to communicate directly with government policy-
makers-serve only as unwieldy surrogates for the distinction between
external and internal channels of communication.
This imprecision is highlighted in Knight by the puzzling failure of
any of the Justices to cite United Mine Workers v. Pennington."'49 In
Pennington, the United Mine Workers Union and a number of large
coal operators jointly petitioned the Secretary of Labor to establish
high minimum wage levels for employees of TVA contractors. A small
operator charged that the union had violated the Sherman Act by con-
spiring to set minimum wage levels so high that smaller companies
would be unable to compete for TVA contracts. The Court rejected this
143. Id. at 1068.
144. With only brief discussion, the Court also rejected the instructors' contentions that
PELRA violated their rights of free association and equal protection under the laws. Id. at
1068-69.
145. Id. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1075-77, 1083-85.
147. Id. at 1082-83.
148. "The First Amendment favors unabridged communication among members of a
free society-including communication between employer and employee. The process of
collective bargaining requires that a limited exception to that general principle be recog-
nized, but until today we have not tolerated any broadening of that exception beyond the
collective bargaining process. The effect of the Minnesota statute is to make the union the
only authorized spokesman for all employees on political matters as well as contractual
matters. In my opinion, such state sponsored orthodoxy is plainly impermissible." Id. at
1086.
149. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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charge, reasoning that the alleged conspirators had directed their efforts
solely at influencing public officials.' 50 The Court relied upon Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,15' which had
held that concerted efforts to influence public officials could not be pro-
hibited under the Sherman Act in view of the First Amendment right to
petition the government.
Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Knight cannot be reconciled with
the decision in Pennington. As in Knight, the communicative activities
in Pennington were not conducted in a public forum, and consisted of
direct contacts with policymakers. Thus, both factors relied upon by
Justice O'Connor-a nonpublic forum and a policymaker listener-
were also present in Pennington. Further, to the extent that the instruc-
tors in Knight were seeking to "force" government policymakers to lis-
ten to them, so was the union in Pennington. In both cases, the officials
in question were willing to listen, but the communication was banned
by statute.' 52 In short, Justice O'Connor's two-pronged reasoning does
not serve to distinguish Knight from Pennington.
The two cases can be reconciled, however, by applying the process
definition of political expression set forth in this Article. Political ex-
pression is defined as expression directed at influencing government
through external channels-that is, channels open, at least formally, to
citizens as citizens. The union in Pennington petitioned the Secretary of
Labor through an external channel. In contrast, the instructors in
Knight sought access to an internal channel open only to government
employees in their capacities as employees.
One major case involving the First Amendment rights of govern-
ment employees remains to be discussed. At first glance, Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District'153 appears to throw a wrench
into the process demarcations. Bessie Givhan was fired from her job as
a teacher in retaliation for criticizing the school's "employment policies
and practices," which she considered to be racially discriminatory. 54
Givhan had communicated these views to her employer in the privacy
of the principal's office. According to the process definitions of speech
developed above, her speech clearly fell in the "private" or labor cate-
gory, subject to minimal or no constitutional protection. Nevertheless,
150. Id at 670.
151. 365 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1961) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 204-08).
152. See Knight, 104 S. Ct. at 1081 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the college ad-
ministrators in Knight claimed that they were willing to listen to the views of the instructors
and that only the provisions of PELRA prevented the communication).
153. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
154. Id at 413.
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the Court held that her expression did not constitute a legitimate basis
for discharge. Justice Rehnquist's terse opinion for a unanimous Court
focused primarily on the distinction between speech in public and
speech in private, and concluded that the public context of the expres-
sion in earlier cases had not been critical to the results.155 Connick, with
its emphasis on the internal office context of Myers' speech, would
seem virtually to overrule Givhan.
Viewed solely in relation to other government employee cases,
Givhan appears as an anomalous departure from the process demarca-
tions. However, when other First Amendment cases are added to the
picture, it is apparent that Givhan is merely one example of a general
exception to the three-systems approach. In cases involving expression
raising racial grievances, the Court has consistently departed from the
process definitions, affording constitutional protection regardless of in-
stitutional context. 156 Though the Givhan opinion did not expressly ac-
knowledge this exception, the Connick opinion relied on it to
distinguish Givhan. The Court observed that racial discrimination-in
contrast to a "personal" employment dispute-is "a matter inherently
of public concern." 
157
In conclusion, the Court has, in rough outline, staked out the pro-
cess boundary between political and labor expression in the govern-
ment employee context. Expression aimed at influencing government
policy is protected-regardless of content and motivation-when ad-
vanced through external channels.' 58 Conversely, such expression is
not generally protected when advanced through internal channels. 59
The Court, however, has recognized an exception for expression con-
cerning racial grievances, which is protected whether advanced through
external or internal channels.1
60
C. The Three-Systems Ladder in Operation: The Boycott Cases
Boycotts and the expressive activities associated with them16 1 have
155. Id. at 414-15 (discussing Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
For a detailed analysis of this aspect of Givhan, see Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Pri-
vale" Forun" Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 217.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 198-203, 209-15. The theoretical basis for this
exception is discussed infra text accompanying notes 268-301.
157. Connick, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 n.8.
158. See uFpra notes 131-32 and text accompanying notes 97-109.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 110-19, 134-52.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
161. The term "boycotts" as used here refers to any organized withholding of patronage,
capital, or labor. Boycott activities may be divided into two types, either or both of which
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been banned or regulated under the common law,1 62 antitrust legisla-
tion,' 63 and the labor laws."6  Prior to the 1930's, not only were boycott
activities constitutionally unprotected, but the Court suggested that the
interests justifying their prohibition were of constitutional dimen-
sion. 65 However, the Supreme Court has recently held that "political"
boycotts are protected under the First Amendment.
66
The boundary between political and labor expression in the boy-
cott area is obscured by layers of empty doctrine. The open articula-
tion of the "citizen-employee" dichotomy in the government worker
cases has no counterpart in the boycott area. Instead, two apparently
neutral doctrines-the speech-conduct distinction and the unlawful ob-
jective test- conceal the differential treatment of labor and other ex-
pression. Beneath those disguises, the three-systems ladder shapes the
pattern of results.
The first-and in many ways, the most interesting--case was that
of Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 167 decided in 1911. The case
arose when three high-ranking officials of the American Federation of
Labor, including Samuel Gompers, were convicted of contempt of
court for violating an injunction that barred them from publicizing "in
may be employed in a given boycott: (1) an agreement among a group of people to withhold
patronage or labor, generally called a "concerted refusal to deal"; and (2) the expressive
activities used to maintain, enforce, and expand a boycott. It has been suggested that these
two types of activity should be treated differently under the First Amendment. See Note,
Political Boycott Actity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659, 686-87 (1978)
(concerted refusals to deal should be accorded less protection than public appeals to boy-
cott). This distinction is grounded in a distrust of intermediate organizations. Because this
distrust permeates-and perhaps even forms the basis of-debate over expressive boycott
activities as well, see infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text, this Article treats the two
types of activity as parts of a single phenomenon.
162. Under the common law, boycotts constituted "tortious interference" with a
merchant's business. See, e.g., Ertz v. Produce Exch. Co., 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737 (1900)
(boycott against merchants by suppliers); Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, 42 A. 607 (1899) (trade
association boycott against nonmembers); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077
(1896) (boycott against employer by employees).
163. For cases prohibiting boycotts under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, see
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild
Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
164. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)
(banning secondary boycotts).
165. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (state denial of injunctive remedy
against labor boycott violated Equal Protection Clause).
166. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 913.
167. 221 U.S. 418 (1911). Commentators have generally ignored Gompers and other pre-
World War I cases. Recent scholarship, however, has unearthed these cases. See Rabban,
T7he First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
Winter 19841
218 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 11:189
any manner" a boycott against the Bucks Stove & Range Company.'
68
The officials had violated this injunction by announcing the boycott in
speeches and labor publications.'
69
Although the Court reversed the convictions on procedural
grounds,'70 it first unanimously rejected the defendants' First Amend-
ment claim, reasoning that the union's boycott publicity constituted
"verbal acts," not speech. 7 ' The formation of unions had created a
"vast power, in the presence of which the individual may be help-
less."' 72 The Court alluded to two types of coercion that could result
from the exercise of this power. First, unions might intimidate laborers
and consumers asked to boycott a business. Slogans such as "Unfair"
and "We don't patronize," when used by massive organizations like
unions, take on "a force not inhering in the words themselves."' 73 The
slogans would merely "signal" the obedience of the workers. The
Court did not attempt to explain why this "force" would hold sway
over the workers, or how it could be transmitted via spoken and printed
advocacy.
1 74
Second, an organized boycott could exert a coercive influence on
owners of property. An individual confronted with union power could
only surrender or go to court for an injunction. 75 Unfortunately, the
Court did not elaborate on why this coercion, which resulted solely
from the peaceful persuasion of workers and consumers, was so evil as
to warrant suppression. In short, the Gompers opinion set up an appar-
ently neutral distinction- that between "verbal acts" and speech-but
let slip a strong hint that behind this distinction lay a visceral fear of
organized working people.
168. 221 U.S. at 420-421, n.1.
169. Id. at 423.
170. Id. at 451-52. The Court held that a settlement of the main civil action between the
labor union and the company "necessarily ended" the civil contempt proceedings in the
case; thus, the convictions of the defendants were set aside because those convictions had
resulted from the civil contempt proceedings.
171. Id. at 439.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. Cf. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The loy-
alties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from ap-
peals by printed word").
175. "[Union power], when unlawfully used against one, cannot be met, except by his
purchasing peace at the cost of submitting to terms which involve the sacrifice of rights
protected by the Constitution; or by standing on such rights, and appealing to the preventive
powers of a court of equity." Id. It is safe to assume that the constitutional rights to which
the Court referred were those of property and liberty, since workers and consumers were not
in the habit of asking courts of equity for labor injunctions.
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For a brief period in the 1940's the Court progressed beyond the
Gompers view of labor expression. In a series of cases beginning with
Thornhill v. Alabama,76 and culminating in International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.,117 the Court first granted and then
effectively withdrew protection for labor picketing associated with boy-
cott activities. As in the government employee cases, protection was
justified on the ground that labor expression was of public, "not mere
local or private," concern.' 78 However, the subsequent limitation and
eventual withdrawal of protection was accomplished without reference
to the public or private character of labor expression. Instead, the
Court employed the speech-conduct distinction and the unlawful ob-
jective test. The empty and conclusory character of those doctrines has
been exposed and critiqued elsewhere. 179 For the purposes of this Arti-
cle, however, it is necessary to review the cases briefly in order to ex-
plore the underlying logic of the Court's current approach.
At first, the Court subjected picketing restrictions to meaningful
scrutiny. Picketing was protected, but could be prohibited when under-
taken for an "unlawful objective."' 80 Soon, however, the withdrawal
of protection outstripped the logic, if not the rhetoric, of this rationale.
Picketing could be prohibited even where the picketers demanded no
illegal action either from the target business or from the workers or
consumers being urged to support the boycott.' 8 ' An unlawful objec-
tive was no longer required; it was enough that the state have a "pol-
icy" against picketing for the particular objective. This circular
approach permitted states to justify injunctions simply by setting forth
a judicial or legislative policy against the picketing.'
8 2
176. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
177. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
178. Thornhillv. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 103-04. SeealsoHaguev. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,512
(1939).
179. See L. TRIBE, CONSTrrTUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 19, at 198-203; Note, supra
note 2, at 940-47; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L.
Rav. 1469, 1475-95 (1982); Note, supra note 161, at 663-71.
180. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (upholding injunc-
tion against picketing where union's objective was to pressure employer into unlawful agree-
ment to refrain from selling ice to nonunion dealers).
181. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950)
(upholding injunction against picketing that sought to pressure self-employed individuals to
join the union even though they had a legal right to do so); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460 (1950) (upholding injunction against picketing aimed at pressuring employer to
hire more blacks). In these cases, the state had not outlawed the objective of the picketers,
but the Court concluded that the illegal objective test was met because a state policy had
been violated. See Hanke, 339 U.S. at 478-79; Hughes, 339 U.S. at 466-68.
182. See Tobriner, The Organizational Picket Line: LawfulEconomic Pressure, 3 STAN. L
REv. 423, 437-39 (1951); see also Note, supra note 2, at 942-43.
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To back up the unlawful objective test, the Court resurrected the
Gompers distinction between speech and action. This distinction has
one meaning outside the labor relations context and another altogether
in the black hole itself. Outside the labor context, the doctrine centers
literally on the physical distinction between speech and conduct. For
example, picketing and parading include components of conduct such
as patrolling that may be regulated. The classification of these activi-
ties as conduct has nothing to do either with the identity of the speaker
or the subject matter of the message. Accordingly, the speech-conduct
distinction in this form can justify only restrictions that are, at least
facially, content-neutral. Outside the labor context, the doctrine has
been confined to that function.
183
In the labor context, on the other hand, the Court routinely em-
ploys the speech-conduct distinction to justify relaxed scrutiny of re-
strictions directed at the content of expression. During the 1950's, the
Court repeatedly rejected challenges to restrictions that affected only
picketing that advocated a boycott. In a series of opinions for the
Court, Justice Frankfurter developed the technique of stating that pick-
eting constituted more than speech, and then switching the focus to the
difficult "social-economic" issues considered by the state in passing the
legislation.'84 He did not attempt to explain why the element of con-
duct in labor picketing should justify reduced scrutiny of restrictions
183. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 601 (contending that the speech-conduct distinction is
relatively harmless because it generally serves as a shorthand approach for distinguishing
between restrictions based on the communicative impact of speech, which are subject to
strict scrutiny, and restrictions based on an interest unrelated to communicative impact); see
also Ely, Flag Desecration: 4 Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv.'1482 (1975). Cases consistent with this approach
include United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (burning draft card was "mixed
speech and conduct" which could be prohibited provided that the restriction furthered a
governmental interest "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"); Adderley v. Flor-
ida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration on jailhouse grounds was unprotected conduct); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (demonstration of 2,000 students outside courthouse con-
stituted "speech plus" that could be prohibited or regulated under "time-place" restrictions).
184. Hanke, 339 U.S. at 474-75; Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464-65; see also Building Service
Employers Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1950). Justice Frankfurter summed
up this trend in International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 290
(1957): "IThe strong reliance on the particular facts in each case demonstrated a growing
awareness that these cases involved not so much questions of free speech as review of the
balance struck by a State between picketing that involved more than 'publicity' and compet-
ing interests of state policy." In these cases, the state did not contend that the restrictive
legislation was directed at the noncommunicative aspects of picketing; on the contrary, the
state argued the prohibitions were necessary to stop the boycotts from successsfully achiev-
ing their objectives. See generally Note, supra note 161, at 664-67.
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directed not at the conduct, but at the communicative impact of the
picketers' message.
The most recent-and revealing--of the labor picketing decisions
is NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, (Safeco).1 85 In
Safeco, a union was enjoined from peacefully picketing a company that
derived most of its income from the sale of insurance policies issued by
a struck employer. The pickets had urged customers of the neutral
company to cancel policies issued by the struck employer. The Court
sustained the injunction, rejecting the union's First Amendment claim.
The plurality and concurring opinions advanced three rationales
for the result." 6 Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, asserted that
the injunction did not offend the First Amendment because of the pick-
eters' unlawful objective.187 However, as Archibald Cox has observed,
the union's objective was unlawful only in the "Pickwickean sense,"
since neither the consumers nor the business owner were asked to do
anything illegal."'
The remaining two rationales corresponded to the two forms of
coercion condemned in Gompers. The plurality was concerned about
the impact of the picketing on the picketed business. 18 9 However,
under current First Amendment doctrine, the coercive impact on the
picketed business is not relevant in making the initial determination as
to the protected or nonprotected status of the expression. Instead, that
factor is properly considered in ascertaining whether the governmental
interest in restricting the expression is sufficiently compelling to justify
content discrimination. 90
Finally, Justice Stevens echoed the Gompers Court's fear that
union boycott advocacy coerces workers and consumers. Also in the
tradition of Gompers, he couched this fear in terms of the speech-con-
duct distinction. In Safeco, there was no indication that the picketing
had been physically coercive, or even that the pickets had persuaded
185. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
186. On the First Amendment issue, the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist joined Justice Powell's opinion for the Court. Justices Blackmun and Stevens con-
curred separately. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dissented on
grounds unrelated to the First Amendment issue.
187. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616.
188. Cox, Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. Reiv. 1, 36 (1980). See
also Note, supra note 2, at 946.
189. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616 ("[secondary] picketing spreads labor discord by coercing a
neutral party to join the fray").
190. See Note, supra note 2, at 945, n.40. In effect, Justice Blackmun adopted this view
in his Safeco concurrence. 447 U.S. at 616-18 (content-based restriction on labor picketing is
justified only because it serves a substantial governmental interest).
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anyone to join the boycott. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens experienced
"little difficulty" upholding the injunction because "[i]n the labor con-
text, it is the conduct element rather than the particular idea being ex-
pressed" that is most persuasive.'' Why? Because union picketing
"calls for an automatic response to a signal rather than a reasoned re-
sponse to an idea." 1
92
Justice Stevens' vision of union picketing has since been adopted
by a unanimous Court.193 Inasmuch as this approach conveys more
than a judicial preference for scholarly discourse, it seems to suggest
that labor picketing coerces by triggering an involuntary and unrea-
soned reaction. 94 Labor unions, however, have no monopoly on emo-
tive communication. Thus, under Justice Stevens' rationale, political
expression, 195 advertising, and most messages designed to provoke ac-
tion could be shorn of protection.
196
The three-systems ladder provides a more logical, if not more de-
fensible, explanation of the Safeco decision. The employee-picketers
were attempting to influence their employer without proceeding
through external democratic channels. Their expressive activities re-
mained within the system of labor relations. Hence, the question of
whether or not to protect such expression could safely be left to Con-
gress' "delicate balance" of free speech and economic interests. 197
The rise of constitutional protection for boycott activities carried
on by civil rights organizations has removed any pretense that the
speech-conduct distinction can explain or rationalize the near-total
withdrawal of protection from labor picketing. In a series of cases, the
Court protected sit-ins on private property conducted to protest the ra-
cial policies of private businesses. The sit-ins were, by any measure, at
least as coercive as picketing. In Garner v. Louisiana,98 for example,
black demonstrators sat in at three "whites only" lunch counters, occu-
pying seats normally reserved for paying customers. The target busi-
nesses were thus directly coerced by the loss of business. Moreover, the
sit-ins did not involve an attempt peacefully to persuade consumers to
join a boycott; the physical presence of the demonstrators prevented
would-be customers from patronizing the targets. Although the Court
191. 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. See ILA, 456 U.S. at 226 n.26.
194. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 19.
195. See Cox, supra note 188, at 47.
196. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 19.
197. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
198. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
managed to provide protection for the demonstrators without reaching
the First Amendment issue,' 99 Justice Harlan addressed that issue in
his concurring opinion. Overlooking the labor cases, he dispensed with
the speech-conduct distinction by asserting that the sit-ins were "as
much a part of the 'free trade in ideas'. . . as is verbal expression, '"2 °°
and that they appealed to "the power of reason as applied through pub-
lic discussion." 0' Hence, Justice Harlan concluded, the sit-ins were
entitled to full First Amendment protection.2 "2 As Harry Kalven
promptly recognized, the Court's preference for civil rights sit-ins over
labor picketing could be explained only in terms of a special commit-
ment to the civil rights movement.203
The key doctrinal breakthrough for rejuvenated constitutional
protection of boycott activity came not in a boycott case, but in a case
involving the Sherman Act's prohibition" against conspiracies in re-
straint of trade. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight,2 4 an association of railroads put out a barrage of anti-
trucking propaganda, utilizing techniques generally prohibited under
the Sherman Act. This effort was aimed at securing the passage of leg-
islation restricting the trucking industry, the railroads' major competi-
tion. The Court found no antitrust violation, noting that to construe
the act to prohibit "political activity" such as this would "raise impor-
tant constitutional questions."20 5 As in the government employees
cases, exemption from economic regulation was linked to the political
character of the expressive activities. In Noerr, the process-oriented
character of the distinction between political and business activities was
made explicit. Neither content nor motivation figured in the Court's
analysis. Instead, the result turned on the fact that the railroads were
exercising their right to petition the legislature.20 6 Noerr was subse-
quently extended to protect access to administrative agencies,2 7 and
199. In connection with the sit-ins, the individuals had been convicted of disturbing the
peace. The Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the convic-
tions. Id at 173-74.
200. Id at 201 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
201. 368 U.S. at 201 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)).
202. 368 U.S. at 207.
203. See H. KALVEN, supra note 16, at 123-72.
204. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
205. Id at 137-38.
206. See id at 136-40.
207. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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courts.20 8
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,°9 the Court explicitly revived
First Amendment protection for boycott activities. There, the NAACP
organized a boycott of white-owned businesses in Port Gibson, Missis-
sippi. The boycotters made demands on both the local government and
local businesses. 210 Seventeen merchants filed suit, alleging violations
of Mississippi's tort law, antitrust legislation, and secondary boycott
statute.211 The concerns underlying the "speech-plus" doctrine in the
labor cases were present in full force. There was violence intermingled
with peaceful boycott activities.21 2 Pickets employed symbols such as
black hats to discourage shoppers from entering white-owned stores.
Boycott violators were ostracized as "traitors" in the black commu-
nity."1 3 Neutral businesses suffered extensive financial loss. 214 Never-
theless, the Court held that the peaceful boycott activities merited
protection, commenting that "[s]peech does not lose its protected char-
acter. . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into
action.
215
Applying the three-systems approach, the holding in Claiborne
may be explained by either of two theories. As noted above, the
NAACP made demands both on government and on private busi-
nesses.216 To the extent that the boycotters were pressuring business
owners to influence elected officials, the boycott picketing fell within
the process definition of political expression.2"7 Alternatively, Clai-
borne could be explained as an application of the racial exception to the
208. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972)
(dictum).
209. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
210. Among the demands addressed to local government were demands for the employ-
ment of blacks by the county government, desegregation of county facilities, and improve-
ments in black neighborhoods. Among those directed at private businesses were demands
that all stores hire black clerks and cashiers and that all businesses in the county comply
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 393 So. 2d 1290, 1296-97
(Miss. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Yhe full list of demands was presented to public
officials, and a subset was presented to the Chamber of Commerce.
211. 458 U.S. at 889-93.
212. In at least four incidents, including two involving shots fired into the homes of non-
boycotters, a direct connection between the boycott and violence was established. Id. at 904.
213. Id
214. The lower court had awarded the merchants $944,699 in damages resulting from
lost business earnings and lost good will. Id. at 893.
215. Id at 910.
216. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
217. Cf. Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980)
(boycott of privately-owned convention facilities with aim of pressuring legislature held to
constitute political activity not prohibitable under Sherman Act).
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three-systems ladder.218
Just three months prior to deciding Claiborne, the Court rejected a
similar First Amendment claim advanced by a union. In International
Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International (ZLA), 21 9 a long-
shoremen's union protested the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by re-
fusing to service ships carrying goods to or from the Soviet Union. The
Court held that this activity violated the secondary boycott provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act220 and rejected the union's consti-
tutional argument in a terse one-paragraph statement:
Application of § 8(b)(4) to the ILA's activity in this case will not
infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the ILA and its
members. We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary
picketing by labor unions in violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected
activity under the First Amendment. It would seem even clearer
that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits
still less consideration under the First Amendment. The labor
laws reflect a careful balancing of interests. There are many ways
in which a union and its individual members may express their
opposition to Russian foreign policy without infringing upon the
rights of others.221
This discussion is representative of the Court's treatment of labor boy-
cotts and picketing. Coercion was mentioned but it is unclear who was
being coerced or how. Having thus dismissed the union's expression as
worthless, the Court concluded its cursory analysis by intoning its def-
erence to Congress on labor matters.
The Court's treatment of the distinction between political and la-
bor expression reflects the strange nature of the labor black hole. In its
brief to the Supreme Court, the union argued vigorously that the boy-
cott activities were entitled to protection as political expression.222 In-
deed, the picketing was clearly political in both content and motivation.
The Court accepted this characterization in its discussion of the boy-
cott's legality under the labor law.223 There, however, the political
character of the boycott activities made them "'more rather than less
objectionable [because the union had departed from] what has tradi-
tionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate union activity.' ,224
218. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
219. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
220. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1935), amended by29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1959).
221. 456 U.S. at 226-27 (footnotes and citations omitted).
222. Petitioner's Brief at 34, 37, 1L.4, 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
223. IL,4, 456 U.S. at 225-26.
224. Id. at 225-26 (quoting Allied Int'l, Inc. v. Local 799, International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)).
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In the constitutional portion of the opinion, where the picketing's polit-
ical nature would have been an asset, the Court simply ignored it.
225
The expressive activities in ILA fell into a nether zone between
political and labor speech and were drawn into the black hole. Under
the process definition, the picketing was not entitled to the protection
accorded political speech because it was directed not at the constitu-
tionally established institutions of government, but at a foreign
power.226 Hence, the picketing lacked sufficient constitutional value to
elude treatment as labor speech.
The contrast between the unanimous opinion in IL/A and the 7-1-0
decision in Claiborne227 illustrates the operation of the three-systems
approach in the boycott area. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in
Claiborne, distinguished ILA and other labor cases by contrasting the
economic restrictions involved in those cases with the political activity
involved in Claiborne.228 The Court conveniently ignored the facts that
Claiborne also involved economic restrictions and that IL/ also in-
volved political activity.229 Justice Stevens, whose opinion in Safeco
225. IL4, 456 U.S. at 266.
226. Cf. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aftd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972) (declining to extend Noerr [discussed supra text accompanying notes 204-06] to im-
munize from Sherman Act prosecution the petitioning of foreign governments); see also
Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1364-67 (5th Cir. 1983) (extending Noerr
to protect the petitioning of foreign governments, but only on statutory grounds).
227. Justice Marshall disqualified himself, and Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judg-
ment without opinion.
228. The labor cases were portrayed as instances of judicial deference to "'Congress'
striking of the delicate balance"' between union free speech and employers' rights, Clai-
borne, 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring)) or to
the states' "broad power to regulate economic activity," 458 U.S. at 913. Having justified the
labor decisions solely with reference to the character of the restrictions, Justice Stevens then
shifted the focus back to the expression, stating that there was no "comparable right to
restrict peaceful political activity such as that [in Claiborne]." Id.
229. See supra text accompanying note 225. There is an arguably significant factual dif-
ference between the two cases-that between the consumer boycott in Claiborne and the
work stoppage in ILA. Commentators have advanced several arguments in support of the
notion that this is a meaningful distinction. First, it has been suggested that unions may
have the power to discipline their members for refusing to support a work stoppage. See
Note, supra note 2, at 938, n.2. However, under current law, unions are prohibited from
spending an individual member's dues for political purposes over the member's objection,
much less from compelling a member to participate in a political boycott. See cases cited
supra note 12. Further, the extent of a union's power to discipline members depends upon
the facts of the particular case. Many union locals are far too weak to employ anything
approaching the formidable sanctions utilized by the NAACP in Claiborne. See supra text
accompanying notes 212-14. A blanket assumption that unions possess the power to coerce
had introduced the term "signal" to the Court's modem lexicon, 30
never mentioned that term in Claiborne. Instead, he dredged up an old
labor case from the Thornhill era, long since crushed in the black hole,
and proclaimed that "'[t]he First Amendment is a charter for govern-
ment, not an institution for learning. "Free trade in ideas" means free
trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe
facts.' "231 In stark contrast to the one paragraph write-off of the First
Amendment claim in IL4, Justice Stevens undertook a sensitive and
in-depth analysis of the political-economic situation in Claiborne
County, noting that the economic and political power structures were
merged, 2 and that the NAACP was fighting a system that had denied
blacks racial justice.33
Stepping back from the particular cases, it is apparent that the
overall pattern of results conforms to the structure of the three-systems
ladder. Boycotts and other expressive activities normally prohibited
under economic regulations gain First Amendment protection when di-
rected at the external processes of government. This protection is ac-
corded whether the purpose and content of the "speaker's" demands
are political234 or economic." On the other hand, such activities go
members into work stoppages could only arise from an unreasoned fear of unions and work-
ers.
Second, it has been pointed out that work stoppages may involve breaches of contract.
See Note, supra note 2, at 938, n.2. However, the employer in IL4 brought suit to enforce
the federal labor law, not to vindicate contractual rights. Moreover, there is no apparent
reason why a breach of contract should remove protection from expression where a violation
of otherwise applicable economic legislation would not. See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 204-06).
Finally, it is argued that producer boycotts, unlike consumer boycotts, are inherently
undemocratic. See Harper, 7he Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware and Is ImplicationsforAmerican Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 427 (1984).
This argument requires a more extensive discussion. See infra text accompanying notes 315-
19.
230. See supra text accompanying note 192. The term "signal" had also been employed
by the Gompers court. See supra text accompanying note 174.
231. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 910 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).
232. See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 889 n.3.
233. Id at 918.
234. See generally Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 209-15); but see American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 391-92
(1950) (discussed supra note 15 and accompanying text).
235. See Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 204-06);
see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (combination of union
and corporations with the aim of setting anti-competitive wage scale, held not to be prohib-
ited under Sherman Act because directed at influencing government officials); California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-511 (1972) (Sherman Act
does not prohibit corporation from filing suit even though its purpose was anticompetitive)
(dictum).
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without protection when not directed at external channels, again with-
out regard to their political 236 or economic 237 purpose or content.
However, where such activities raise racial grievances, they are pro-
tected even when not directed at external channels.238
The process analysis applied here to cases involving government
workers and private sector boycotts could be extended throughout the
First Amendment area. In distinguishing political from commercial
advocacy, for example, the analysis would focus on whether the com-
munication was directed at influencing listeners in their roles as partici-
pants in the exterior processes of government, or in their roles as
participants in the economic marketplace.23  And, in distinguishing
protected political spending from unprotected bribes, the inquiry
would focus on whether, at some point, the transaction proceeded
openly through the exterior processes of government. 240 For a final ex-
ample, protected political association would be distinguished from un-
protected economic association on the basis of whether or not the
associative activities were directed at external democratic channels.241
In short, the government employee and boycott cases are only illustra-
tive of the trend all along the system boundaries.
III. The Three-Systems Ladder and Constitutional Vision
The rise of constitutional protection for rights of free expression
236. See IL4, 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 219-31).
237. See Safeco, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 185-96);
see also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 693 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), and
the other labor picketing cases discussed supra notes 180-82, 184 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 198-202); ef Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (over-
turning injunction against residential picketing of real estate broker in protest of racial sales
practices); but see Hughes, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (upholding injunction against picketing of
store by black citizens group demanding that blacks be hired in proportion to their popula-
tion in the area). Note that Hughes was decided prior to the rise of the racial exception,
which coincided with the wave of civil rights protests in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
239. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1983) (find-
ing it unnecessary to protect comments on public issues made in the context of commercial
transactions because such comments may be made outside that context with full protection);
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63, n.5 (1980) (same).
240. In Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), for example, the Court held that a candi-
date's promise to cut the pay of his office if elected was protected political expression even
though he was proposing to provide taxpayers with a pecuniary benefit in exchange for
votes. The Court acknowledged that even those commercial solicitations that affect the
political arena are normally prohibitable. Id. at 56. Nonetheless, "[slo long as the hoped-for
personal benefit is to be achieved through the normal processes of government, and not
through some private arrangement, it has always been, and remains, a reputable basis on
which to cast one's ballot." Id (emphasis added).
241. See supra note 30.
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coincided with the decline of protection for economic rights.242 The
three-systems ladder can be understood only with reference to this de-
cisive reversal of judicial values. The shift was initially advocated and
later rationalized on the basis of two general theories of "preferred
rights," one grounded in values of self-government and the other in
such nebulous values as "self-fulfillment. '2 43 This Article examines the
three-systems ladder solely in relation to the values of self-government.
There are three reasons for this relatively narrow focus. First, the doc-
trinal content of the ladder has been shaped and justified primarily
with reference to those values.2' Second, the "preferred rights" theory
based on values of self-government has gained virtual hegemony
among both commentators and Justices.245 Finally, though the clash
between process and substance, self-government and self-fulfillment,
and instrumental and noninstrumental conceptions of the First
Amendment will not be resolved here, it should be noted that theories
built on the latter half of each of these dichotomies are fundamentally
incapable of rationalizing the simultaneous protection of "personal"
rights and nonprotection of "economic" rights.246 Hence, as long as the
Court continues to subject economic and social legislation to minimal
242. On the rise of First Amendment protection, see Kairys, Freedom ofSpeech, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 140 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). On the decline of economic due process, see
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
243. See McCloskey, supra note 242, at 45-50.
244. See supra part II of this Article.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36. The self-government value is supported
by powerful textual, structural, and "neutrality" arguments. See BeVier, supra note 26.
Dean Ely has situated these arguments in a general theory of constitutional law. SeeJ. ELY,
supra note 18.
246. Not only does the self-fulfillment theory have "the smell of the lamp" about it,
McCloskey, supra note 242, at 46, it is simply too subjective and indeterminate to provide
the basis for a theory of constitutional review that is sensitive to the difficulty of legitimating
choices made by an unelected branch of government. At a gut level, the problem with this
indeterminacy may be summed up in the question: "Who are judges to tell me or anybody
else that talking is more fulfilling than producing useful products?" At the level of liberal
theory, the problem is that the self-fulfillment value involves not only constitutional protec-
tion of liberty, but also judicial determination of "the good." See Bork, supra note 26, at 25.
The distinction between liberty and "the good" traces back to the theory of the social con-
tract. According to this theory, a rational individual-whether in a state of nature or an
imaginary "original position"--would rationally choose to accept the existence of a coercive
state only if guaranteed the liberty to seek happiness according to his own definition of "the
good." See generally J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also J. LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1698). Though it may be true that any conception of liberty
or process necessarily embodies a conception of "the good," see Tribe, The Puzzling Persis-
lance ofProcess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), such a conception
must-at least under the legal system in its present form-be mediated by a more determi-
nate and structured set of legal ideals te -eserve the appearance of the rule of law and
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scrutiny, theories based on values of self-government will be of more
use to litigators in attempting to defend and expand First Amendment
rights.
247
The vision of the First Amendment as guarantor of the processes
of representative government is grounded in the famous Carolene Prod-
ucts footnote 248 and fleshed out with the ideal of pluralism.249 Accord-
ing to the pluralist vision, society is divided into a large number of
competing interest groups. In the well functioning polity, no single
group gains dominance; all groups are able to press their concerns and
make alliances, thereby ensuring that their interests will receive fair
consideration. Politics consists of the coalescence of temporary majori-
ties because society, and even individuals themselves, are fractured into
many competing interests. As long as the process is fair, everyone must
abide by the results, win or lose.250 The Court, an antimajoritarian
institution, is limited to two functions: protecting the representative
process from attempts by temporary majorities to consolidate their
power and shut out other groups, and rectifying outcomes that result
from the presence of "discrete and insular" minorities who, because of
"prejudice" or structural disadvantages, are unable to participate effec-
tively in coalition building.251
sustain the legitimacy of judicial review. But see Baker, supra note 37 (since commercial
speech is compelled by market dynamics, it is not an expression of liberty).
247. This is not to suggest that criticism of the economic-political distinction is not a
valid part of the debate over values. But what is useful in prescriptive debate is not neces-
sarily useful in descriptive analysis; to insist that values such as "self-fulfillment" can help to
explain the current practice of the Court is to obscure the contradictions and tensions in the
underlying doctrinal structure.
248. "It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire
whether. . . prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry. .. ." United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(citations omitted).
249. For authoritative support, commentators look to James Madison's contributions to
The Federalist, particularly an. 10 & 51. For comprehensive pluralist theories of constitu-
tional law, see J. ELY, supra note 18, and J. CHOPER, supra note 18.
250. For classic and comprehensive statements of the pluralist theory, see R. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
(1951). See also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) ("[Pjolitical judgments are the product of rough compromise struck
by contending groups within the democratic process.") (citing R. DAHL, supra).
251. There is a lively debate over what type of disadvantage is of constitutional dimen-
sion. Compare J. ELY, supra note 18, at 152-53 ("discrete and insular" minorities are unable
to participate effectively because other groups are prejudiced against them and therefore
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For the purposes of this Article, the Carolene Products vision raises
two major unsettled issues. First, what is the remedy for the plight of
"discrete and insular" minorities? The prevailing view relies solely
upon the application of strict equal protection scrutiny to governmental
action that disadvantages those groups. 2  Indeed, special protection of
disadvantaged groups in the process itself would violate the supreme
process principle of strict governmental neutrality among opposing
speakers and viewpoints.2 5 3 Section A assesses the three-systems lad-
der in light of this "formal-neutral" view of the First Amendment.
Though the Court's duty of impartiality is a matter of canon, it has
long been recognized that civil rights protests received special protec-
tion at the height of the southern civil rights movement. 4 Professor
Robert Cover25 5 has described the history of Supreme Court interven-
tion in the civil rights struggle in terms of a conscious shift from out-
come scrutiny, exemplified by Brown v. Board of Education,25 6 to First
Amendment protection for militant civil rights tactics, exemplified by
sit-in cases such as Garner v. Louisiana.2 57 This approach will be called
the "group-sensitive" vision of the First Amendment. Instead of recti-
fying the outcomes that result from flaws in the process, the Court pro-
vides the disadvantaged group with the tools needed to correct both the
process and the outcomes. Section B examines the three-systems lad-
der from this perspective.
The second unresolved question asks how far the processes of rep-
resentation extend. If only the formal processes of representative gov-
ernment are included,258 then the Supreme Court has gone too far in
shun them in the bargaining process) with C. MACKINNON, supra note 25, at 116-18 (groups
that are effectively subjugated-culturally, economically, and politically-need aggressive
judicial intervention on their behalves).
252. See, e.g., J. ELY, supranote 18, at 135-79.
253. For well-supported discussions of this principle, see Karst, supra note 19, at 29-35;
Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 215-18
(1982); J. ELY, supra note 18, at 105-34. Commentators and justices are nearly unanimous on
this general point. They disagree, however, whether this principle extends to subject-matter
restrictions or to facially neutral restrictions that impose unequal burdens on different view-
points. See, e.g., Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978) (contending that subject-matter
restrictions are less suspect than viewpoint restrictions).
254. Harry Kalven portrayed the series of civil rights protest cases as a war between the
NAACP and the "South," with the Supreme Court actively enlisted on the side of the
NAACP. See H. KALVEN, supra note 16.
255. See Cover, he Origins of JudicialActiism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287, 1311-13 (1982).
256. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
257. 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 198-202).
258. For the narrowest view on this issue, see supra note 57.
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protecting commercial speech and in guaranteeing some rights to em-
ploy economic power in the political system. However, if the institu-
tions of representative government are inextricably connected to all
power relations in society, then the rigid boundaries among the systems
are unjustifiable because labor relations and even commercial competi-
tion may be regarded as struggles for power.259 Section C suggests that
by granting constitutional protection to some rights of economic ex-
pression, the Court has stepped onto a slippery slope toward constitu-
tional protection for general rights of economic participation.
A. The Three-Systems Ladder Viewed from the Formal-Neutral
Perspective
Most Carolene Products enthusiasts take a narrow view of the
political process protected by the First Amendment, limiting it to the
formal institutions of representative government.2 60 This view is con-
sistent with the process definition of political speech, which centers on
the flow of speech through the formal processes of government.
261 It
also comports with the nonprotection of labor speech.
Adherents of the Carolene Products vision, however, are split over
the issue of protection for commercial speech. Most oppose protection
on the ground that commercial speech, measured against the values
embodied in the Carolene Products footnote, is "remarkable for its in-
significance.1262  John Hart Ely, however, urges protection for all
speech, with narrow exceptions, as a safety zone around core Carolene
Products speech.263
The three-systems ladder clashes with formal-neutral precepts in
two important respects. First, the Court's preference for commercial
speech over labor speech violates the principle of neutrality. If protec-
tion for commercial speech is justifiable at all, it is only as part of a
protective zone around political expression. There is no apparent rea-
son why that protective zone should not extend to labor as well as com-
259. For a powerful argument in support of this proposition, see M. WALZER, SPHERES
OF JUSTICE 300-03 (1983) (large-scale business enterprises are de facto political units and
should be structured according to constitutional principles of democracy). See also C. LIND-
BLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 171 (1977) (delegation of decisions on production and allo-
cation of resources to businessmen does not diminish the public aspect of those decisions).
260. See, e.g., the works cited supra note 18.
261. See supra text accompanying note 73.
262. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 2, at 14. See also BeVier, supra note 26, at 352-55.
263. J. ELY, supra note 18, at 233 n.27. The disagreement between Ely and scholars such
as BeVier is not over First Amendment values, but over the extent to which the judiciary
may be trusted to make value judgments concerning the worth of speech.
mercial speech. 264 Differential treatment could be justified only with
reference to values of economic efficiency, which, in the Carolene para-
digm, are the concern of the legislature-not the Court.z65 This prob-
lem, however, has not provoked much criticism from formal-neutral
theorists, perhaps because labor expression has no affirmative value in
the Carolene Products vision.
2 66
Second, in selectively protecting some applications of economic
power to the political process, the Court has exceeded the bounds of
formality. In the formal-neutral view, economic and political power
should be distinguished analytically, and protection accorded only to
exercises of the latter.267 The Court's protection of political expendi-
tures and contributions, as well as certain boycott activities, violates
this separation. Moreover, the differential treatment of business enter-
prises, civil rights organizations, and labor unions in the exercise of
economic power infringes upon the neutrality of the formal political
process. Unlike the Court's preference for commercial over labor ex-
pression, these disparities threaten the core values of the formal-neutral
approach.
B. The Three-Systems Ladder Viewed from the Group-Sensitive
Perspective
In the Carolene Products vision, those groups that are unable to
ensure that their interests will be fairly considered in the political pro-
cess require special judicial protection. In the First Amendment area,
264. Id. at 111-16 (contending that all restrictions aimed at the communicative impact of
protected speech must be subjected to strict scrutiny).
265. See Note, supra note 2, at 959-60 (protection of commercial speech and nonprotec-
tion of labor picketing indicates the adoption of Lochner-type free enterprise values by the
Court). For judicial expression of economic values, see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove,
404 U.S. 898 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari): "[Commercial speech]
could not be regarded as less important than political expression. When immersed in a free
flow of commercial information, private sector decisionmaking is at least as effective an
institution as are our various governments in furthering the social interest in obtaining the
best general allocation of resources." Id at 905 (citing economic texts). It has also been
suggested that protection for commercial speech could be justified with reference to consum-
ers' rights to know. See Note, ConstitutionalProtection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L.
Rv. 720, 745-46 (1982). This argument, however, would also justify protection for labor
speech, since presumably consumers have a right to know whether a product is being pro-
duced by underpaid workers or strikebreakers.
266. On the few occasions those theorists have addressed the problem, it has usually been
to note the lack of value of labor speech. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 253, at 204.
267. John Rawls, a formal-neutral thinker par excellence, urges the total exclusion of
economic power from the political process in order to prevent inequalities, which are desira-
ble in the market, from intruding into the political sphere where absolute equality is the rule.
See J. RAwLs, supra note 246, at 225-28.
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this means special protection for the associational and expressive activ-
ities of those groups.268 The special treatment afforded civil rights pro-
tests is the prime example; as noted above, that treatment amounts to a
cross-systemic exception granting political speech status to all race-re-
lated grievances. 26 9 Not only is the community of black Americans the
quintessential example of a group that has been structurally excluded
from effective political participation, but special treatment of black
protests can be justified with reference to the Civil War Amend-
ments.2 0 Were the formal-neutral theorists forced to confront the ra-
cial exception, they might well accept it but draw the line there.27'
However, because of the vital role of group representation in the plu-
ralist model, there is constant pressure to consider the identity and
needs of particular groups.272 Hence, it is not surprising that group-
sensitive concerns pervade the structuring of the three systems
themselves.
On the transcendent-immanent spectrum, the commercial system
is on the immanent side of the political system and on the transcendent
side of the labor relations system.273 The Court has explained the rela-
tionship between the commercial and political systems with reference
to the "hardiness" of commercial speech, which is the "sine qua non of
commercial profits."274 Indeed, commercial speech is hardy not only in
the immediate sense that there is less danger of chilling it, but also in
the political sense. Business interests have both the incentive and the
268. See Cover, supra note 255, at 1311-12. See generally H. KALVEN, supra note 16.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 156-57, 198-203, 209-15, 238.
270. See, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 914 (1982) ("The right of the States to regulate
economic activity could not justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically-
motivated boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate
rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself."). Neither the subjugated position of blacks nor
the effectiveness and indispensibility of the forms of organization and protest protected by
the Court need be recounted here.
271. Arguing by analogy to blacks, it could be suggested that civil rights protests by
women should also be accorded cross-systemic protection. See Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (secondary boycott by NOW to encourage
Illinois legislature to ratify the ERA held protected against suit under Sherman Act and
state tort law) (cited by the Supreme Court in Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 914 n.48). Any serious
attempt to address that issue, however, would require an assessment of the possiblility that
the area of sexual relations constitutes a fourth system of power, a project which is beyond
the scope of this Article.
272. In Professor Parker's terminology, this pressure sets up a tension between two essen-
tial attributes of judicial review: sensitivity and detachment. See Parker, Political Vision in
Constitutional Argument, supra note 65, at 21-22.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
274. Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. See also Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 564 n.6.
wherewithal to insure that their opposition to restrictions on commer-
cial speech will be forcefully asserted in the political process. 275 Hence,
the judgment that commercial speech requires less protection than
political speech is consistent with the Carolene Products view.
The placement of the commercial system to the transcendent side
of the labor system, however, is difficult if not impossible to justify.
The only principle of order immanent in the labor system is that of
employer authoritarianism. Employee labor speech is frail and vulner-
able in comparison with commercial speech. The profit incentive relied
upon by the Court to justify lowered protection for commercial speech
is lacking in the labor context since there is no immediate relationship
between picketing or other expressive activities and individual prof-
its.2 76 Moreover, unions-viewed in relation to their opposition, busi-
ness enterprises-cannot be relied upon to secure adequate protection
for labor speech through the political process. Unions are heavily out-
spent by corporations.277 Although union members do outnumber busi-
ness owners and stockholders, unions have failed to deliver
politically. 278 Finally, the base of union strength in industry has
eroded; from a peak of thirty-five percent of the workforce in 1954,
union membership sank to less than thirty percent by 1965, and barely
twenty percent in 1980.279 These losses have been attributed to a vari-
ety of factors, including the decline of basic industry, changing demo-
graphic patterns, and biases in the legal apparatus of collective
bargaining-none of which is likely to disappear in the near future. In
short, labor expression is not nearly so robust as commercial speech
and thus deserves more, not less protection.
Notwithstanding the widely acknowledged decline of unionism,
the notion persists that labor speech is adequately protected in the pri-
275. The judgment that business enterprises enjoy at least their fair share of clout in the
political process accords with the views of mainstream political theorists. See, e.g., R. DAHL,
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 450-93 (1976) (wealthy interests exercise dispropor-
tionate influence on political process); C. LINDBLOM, supra note 259, at 170-200 (business
exercises a disproportionate impact on American politics).
276. SeeM. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that an individ-
ual has no incentive to engage in collective activity when her marginal contribution is not
likely to influence the result). Furthermore, the threat of legal retribution is a greater deter-
rent to unions than to business enterprises. Unions cannot afford extensive legal fees, and a
single damage award can financially cripple a union for years.
277. Wright, supra note 2, at 614 n.35.
278. The political impotence of labor relative to business is illustrated by the failure of
labor to secure passage of any legislation affecting the basic structure of private sector bar-
gaining since 1935, despite a determined effort in the late 1970's when the Democratic Party
controlled both the Presidency and the Congress.
279. G. BAIN & R. PRICE, PROFILES OF UNION GROWTH 163-65 (1980).
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vate sector by the labor laws and in the public sector by the strategic
position of public employees. Constitutional scholars have suggested
that the protection of private sector labor picketing has been shifted to
the federal labor laws.2
8 0
However, the labor laws as applied provide no substitute for judi-
cial enforcement of the Constitution. Under the labor laws, constitu-
tional values are reversed. Economic activities are valued and
protected; political activities are not.81 Once again, the relegation of
labor speech to a "black hole" is apparent. In constitutional analysis,
the Court stands aside, entrusting the protection of labor expression to
Congress and the NLRB. But under the labor law, expression that is-
from a constitutional perspective-of the greatest value goes relatively
unprotected. Moreover, the NLRB, which enforces the labor laws, is
no substitute for the courts because it is highly susceptible to political
influence by succeeding administrations.282 Nor does the bottom line
give reason for confidence; the most precipitous union decline has oc-
curred in the private sector under the aegis of these laws. 83 Finally,
given the political weakness of unions, there is no particular reason to
believe that Congress will provide adequate safeguards for labor
speech.
Protection for public sector labor expression raises the spectre of
unions exercising a disproportionate influence on the political process.
Collective bargaining is seen by some as a special channel of influence
for government employees.28 4 The desirability of collective bargaining
in public employment is hotly debated and will not be resolved here."'
280. See, e.g, G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1417
(10th ed. 1980) (contending that the declining significance of the First Amendment in the
labor picketing area is due not only to First Amendment cases withdrawing protection, but
also to "congressional occupation of the field and the growing displacement of state control
of picketing because of [federal] preemption principles").
281. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
282. See Cooke & Gautschi, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 35
INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rv. 539 (1982) (statistical regression analysis demonstrates the polit-
ical bias of the NLRB under different administrations).
283. While public sector unions have made major gains since 1955, the percentage of
union members in the private sector declined from over 38% in 1954 to 24% in 1978. Weiler,
Promises to Keep: Securing Worker's Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLAX, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1771-72 n.4 (1983).
284. Wellington & Winter, The Limits on Collective Bargaining in Public Employment in
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS
51, 72 (Institute for Contemporary Studies 1976).
285. Compare id with Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L.L 1156, 1200 (1974) (collective bargaining should be implemented in the public
sector because it "provides a structure and procedure which generally reflects the political
forces involved").
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But-however great the potential problems of collective bargaining
may be-they cannot justify the removal of protection from labor
speech without searching scrutiny of both the government's interests
and the means used to further those interests. The fixing of terms and
conditions of employment for public employees is an integral aspect of
the political process.286 Communication among public employees on
the job is perhaps their most basic form of participation in that process.
In the group-sensitive Carolene Products model, there is no justification
for removing protection from those expressive activities, particularly
where, as in Connick,2 7 the activities involved are prerequisites to in-
terest group formation. If expressive activities do pose a danger of
skewing the political process in favor of public employees, that factor
should be considered as one of the state's interests in prohibiting the
expression, not as a justification for lowered scrutiny.
Up to now, this Article has argued merely that labor expression
should receive at least as much protection as commercial expression,
and that if corporations enjoy the right to employ their characteristic
forms of economic power in the political process, so should unions. The
reasons for affording protection to unions, however, extend beyond
bootstrapping on the gains of corporations. The decline of unions
means trouble for the pluralist model. Since the 1950's, there has been
widespread complacency over the position of labor in our society. In
the prevailing view, the Wagner Act, upheld by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,288 reversed a century of judicial
anti-unionism and incorporated labor into the pluralist polity as a rec-
ognized interest group.289 But if unions continue to lose ground, work-
ers-and in the view of some analysts, all lower income persons-will
be left without effective representation in the political process.290
286. Wellington & Winter, supra note 284, at 72; Summers, supra note 285, at 1198. Cf.
City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976).
287. Connic4 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 120-29).
288. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
289. For a classic statement of this view, see J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM 115-
57 (1952).
290. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1394, 1416 (1971) ("ITmhe depressed voting rates of manual workers, and the low
level of unionization in the labor force, create large segments of working people who lack
much political strength in government circles. The upshot is not that nonunion workers lack
any political representation; unions do press for social welfare measures that primarily bene-
fit poor workers, and politicians of both parties have advocated similar measures. Neverthe-
less, it is probably fair to say that workers in unorganized sectors of our economy have much
less political influence than their counterparts in similar occupations abroad."). See also id.
at 1424 (unions have remained the only major organized group to press for improvements in
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Moreover, the void of constitutional protection is particularly harmful
to the large and rapidly growing number of workers employed in serv-
ice, clerical, and agricultural jobs, which are mostly nonunionized.
These workers are in desperate need of interest group representation,
but the Court has spotted no Carolene Products problem in restrictions
upon their self-organization as employees.
291
The Court is not likely to show much concern over this situation so
long as it views unions as coercive, selfish wards of the state that derive
their legitimacy solely from the narrow economic function they per-
form in the system of collective bargaining.292 The merits of that view,
which derive not from any legal source but from Selig Perlman's fa-
mous treatise on American labor unions,293 cannot be addressed ade-
quately in this Article. It is important, however, to make three brief
points. First, as long as the current structure of collective bargaining
remains in place, there will be a tension between unions as voluntary
associations of workers, and unions as government-shaped organiza-
tions with a legally defined role to play in collective bargaining.
Though suppression of the voluntary association aspect may be integral
to the national labor policy,294 it is highly suspect when viewed through
the lens of the Carolene Products vision, since it represents a selective
constraint on interest group organization. Moreover, the fact that un-
ions are to some extent narrow econbmic organizations is as much a
result of the withdrawal of constitutional protection as a justification
social welfare legislation). Mainstream political theorists have long recognized that the level
of participation and influence of lower income people in the United States is strikingly low
compared to other western-style democracies. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 275, at 45L
Even the current effectiveness of unions as representatives is open to question. See supra
notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
291. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 312-14 (1979) (up-
holding Arizona law that excluded most of the UFW's membership from representation
elections).
292. This picture emerges clearly from the cases discussed in this Article. Labor picket-
ing is deemed inherently coercive, regardless of the particular facts. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 190-92. Selfish and petty labor concerns are contrasted with noble public
expression. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 124, 228-33. The view that unions are
confined to a narrow function involving "private" economic concerns is discussed in Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MiNN. L. Rlv. 265 (1978); Stone, The Post- War Paradigm in American Labor
Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). The notion that state involvement is responsible for union
power has been invoked to justify constraints on union but not corporate power. See supra
notes 10- 1l and accompanying text.
293. See generally S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOvEMENT (1928).
294. See Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLMTICS OF LAw 65,
78-80 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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for that withdrawal.2 95 The remedy should be more protection for
democratic and progressive trends within the labor movement, not con-
tinued privatization and suppression. The Constitution does not enact
Selig Perlman's vision of American trade unionism.
Second, the labor movement is much too variegated for a single
picture to describe the reality.2 96 There is no basis--other than overt
antipathy toward labor-for the blanket removal of protection from
labor expression without regard to the actual coercive character of
union protests or the "selfishness" of their goals. Yet, the Court has
withdrawn protection from both noncoercive and coercive picketing,297
and from both young idealistic unions as well as older business un-
ions.298 At a minimum, the Court should-in the labor context as well
as the civil rights context-avoid burning down the forest to kill a few
"reptiles hidden in the weeds.
2 99
Finally, neither selfishness nor state sponsorship can serve as a ba-
sis for elevating corporate speech above union speech in the hierarchy
of First Amendment values."° Although there may be worries that un-
ions will become "little commonwealths" within the big one, these wor-
ries do not distinguish unions from corporations. During the late
1940's and early 1950's, when excavation of the black hole began, many
295. The idealistic trends in the labor movement were dealt a massive blow in the late
1940's in the name of fighting communism. The Supreme Court, as part of its general capit-
ulation to McCarthyism, upheld the anticommunist affidavit requirement used to carry out
this purge. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Years
later, the Court overturned similar requirements applied to the NAACP. Louisiana v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). Similarly, the system of exclusive bargaining representation
fostered trends toward bureaucratic rule. In response, Congress passed legislation designed
to protect internal union democracy. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1975). But the Court
construed this legislation narrowly in the interest of preserving the unions as effective agents
of industrial stability. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964) (holding that the
Secretary of Labor had exclusive discretion to enforce membership rights to nominate can-
didates and vote in union elections). See generally James, Union Democracy and the
LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rlv. 247 (1978).
296. See Pope, Free Speech Rights of Union Officials Under the Labor Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 525, 530-38 (1983) (demonstrating
that four distinct visions of unionism-some narrow and economic, others not--compete
within the union movement).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 189-92.
298. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (discussed supra
note 291).
299. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 933-34.
300. See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67 (status as a state monopoly does not
deprive a corporation of its right to engage in commercial expression); Consolidated Edison,
447 U.S. at 533-34 (status as a state monopoly does not deprive a corporation of its right to
engage in political expression). See generally Brudney, supra note 2.
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observers feared that the labor movement was on the verge of becom-
ing a dominant faction. Under current conditions, however, those fears
can only be described as paranoid. °
C. Beyond Carolete Products: On the Slippery Slope Toward Rights of
Economic Participation
The Supreme Court has decisively rejected attempts to insulate the
political process from influence by concentrated economic power,302 or
to prohibit the use of the political process for private economic pur-
poses.30 3 In so doing, the Court has breached the liberal cordon
san'taire between the economic and political systems, albeit on a selec-
tive basis.304 This move toward a dialectical (or interconnected) view
of political and economic life could, if consolidated, mark the begin-
ning of a third stage in the historical development of the economic-
political distinction in constitutional law.
The first stage was that of classical liberalism. Common law doc-
trines of conspiracy and tortious interference outlawed most forms of
labor or consumer organization, while constitutional rights of property
and contract insulated the market from political intervention.305 The
second stage was that of pluralist liberalism. Government was permit-
ted to intervene massively in the market with the aim of setting up "fair
competition" both among business enterprises and between labor and
capital. This was accomplished not by creating constitutional rights of
economic participation, but by removing property and contract barriers
to legislative intervention. The market became a kind of no-man's land
in constitutional law. The Carolene Products footnote provided a theo-
301. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79. Even John Kenneth Galbraith, who is
credited with originating the influential idea that unions provide a countervailing weight to
corporate power, has since acknowledged that he took an "unduly sanguine view of the
resulting equilibrium." See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 73, at 74 n.1.
302. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (right to
associate for purposes of raising and spending money); Bellotl, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (right of
organizations chartered for economic purposes to enter into the political process); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (right to spend money on political campaigns); see also Claiborne,
458 U.S. 886 (1982) (right to withhold patronage); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (right to engage in boycott activities to encourage
ratification of constitutional amendment).
303. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972) (access to courts) (dictum); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)
(lobbying); Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (appeals to electorate).
304. In most major theories of liberalism, a sharp distinction has been drawn between
the economic and political systems. For a classic argument that the political system should
be insulated from economic power, see J. RAwLs, supra note 246, at 225-28.
305. See generally AFL v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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retical foundation for the economic-political distinction in this new
form.
3 06
This Article optimistically refers to the nascent third stage as "dia-
lectical pluralism" because it recognizes to a limited extent the inter-
connected character of economic and political struggle. It is, perhaps,
less of a coherent stage than a slippery slope between Carolene Products
and constitutional protection for general rights of economic
participation.0 7
Having recognized the right of selected groups to employ certain
forms of economic power in the political process, the Court is now
under pressure to extend those rights to other groups and forms of eco-
nomic power.30 8 From there, it would be but a small step to recognize
that the processes which produce economic power are integrally,
though indirectly, related to the political process itself. This step would
reflect a recognition that interest groups are engaged in a combined
political-economic struggle for power, and that the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech should apply to both aspects of this struggle.
To put it another way, if the Constitution envisions political processes
founded on free debate among contending viewpoints and if it also
protects the free exercise of economic power in those processes, then it
follows that the processes which produce this economic power should
also be governed by the principle of free debate among opposing view-
points. This hypothesis, though not expressly articulated by the Court,
may underlie protection for commercial speech.30 9 Although an ex-
306. See generally McCloskey, supra note 242.
307. The question of the exact type of economic rights that should be recognized is a
subject of intense debate. In the view of some, the Court should revive the Lochner era
protection of individual rights to engage in free-enterprise activites. See, e.g., R. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549-50 (2d ed. 1977). Others argue that the Court should
protect collective rights to influence economic decisionmaking. See generally M. WALZER,
supra note 259.
308. In saying that the Supreme Court is under pressure, this Article does not suggest
that the Court is mechanically constrained by norms of fairness and rationality. As the
Lochner era illustrates, the Court can hold out for long periods of time utilizing a patently
partisan approach. However, as long as the Court attempts to shield itself from criticism
and pressure by erecting neutral-sounding doctrinal rationalizations, the selective granting
of rights to exercise economic power is likely to be a sore spot. The Court could, of course,
resolve the tension by returning to the pre-Buckley situation when those rights were not
recognized. A return to the narrow, formal view of the political process would, however,
merely preserve the illusion that the economic and political systems can be surgically
separated.
309. Compare, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (protecting commercial expres-
sion by public utility) with Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (protecting political
expression by public utility). In both cases, utilities were fighting for their continued exist-
ence against state policies that favored their economic competitors. The fact that one utility
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tended discussion on fights of economic participation is beyond the
reach of this Article, it should be noted that pluralist liberal methodol-
ogy can generate both functional3 10 and philosophical31 arguments in
favor of an integrated conception of political and economic power.
In repudiating the liberal effort to keep economic power out of the
political process, the Court has damaged the ideology that supports
that process. Historically, the idea of "one person-one vote" has served
as a powerful legitimator.3 2 Although the correspondence of the idea
with social reality-in terms of actual political influence-has long
been challenged, the idea itself retains considerable force. In major
part, its continuing vitality derives from the simple fact that on election
day each citizen can enter a polling place and cast one and only one
ballot.
In contrast to voting, the various forms of economic power lack
any common denominator that is possessed by individuals in equal
shares. Economic power rests upon the shifting and diverse base of the
capitalist economy. An individual's share of economic power depends
upon his assets, capabilities, and strategic position in the economy.
Hence, the Court's forthright sanctioning of the use of economic power
in the political process necessarily conflicts with the ideal of equal
political influence among individuals.
In response to this problem, many critics simply cling to the liberal
view that the political and economic systems should be kept sepa-
was pursuing this struggle in the political process and the other in the economic marketplace
may have been less important than the fact that both were using speech in a struggle for
power and survival.
310. The Carolene Products vision, standing alone, guarantees groups the right to organ-
ize and participate in the formal processes of democracy. But these rights do not guarantee a
fair process when, under the guise of economic regulation or taxation, the state can prevent
an interest group organization from fulfilling its function. Thus, Judge J. Skelly Wright has
suggested that the right to strike should be constitutionally protected because freedom of
association requires protection of "essential organizational activities which give the associa-
tion life and promote its fundamental purposes." United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount,
325 F. Supp 879, 885 (D.C. Cir.) (three-judge district court) (Wright, J., concurring), affd,
404 U.S. 802 (1971).
311. The method of the original position as developed by John Rawls could, though
Rawls himself avoids the subject, generate a plausible argument for recognition of rights of
participation in the workplace. According to Rawls, rational individuals, placed in the posi-
tion of having to decide on a social system without knowing what position they would oc-
cupy in that system, would value complete equality of political liberty over any material
benefit. J. RAWLS, supra note 246, at 60-65. It seems reasonable to conclude that those same
liberty-loving individuals, recognizing that they would most likely spend the bulk of their
waking time in a subordinate position in an economic institution, would also value liberty
there.
312. See J. GALBRA1TH, supra note 73, at 147.
rate.31 3 This approach, however, has two crippling diasdvantages.
First, it is bad strategy. The Court has committed itself to some merg-
ing of the political and economic systems. To stand back and attack
the merger itself is to evade the debate over the central issue now con-
fronting the Court: how to structure and limit constitutional protection
for rights of economic participation.
Second, and more fundamentally, this approach ignores the reality
that in our society political and economic power are intimately and
inseparably intertwined. A pristine "one person, one vote" political
system cannot coexist alongside the current economic system-which is
characterized by immense disparities of wealth and power-without
considerable seepage of economic power into the political system.314
The question is how to limit and direct the political exercise of eco-
nomic power.
A different approach is presented in Michael Harper's recent arti-
cle on boycott rights.31 5 Harper suggests that the boycott rights recog-
nized in Claiborne31 6 should be extended to labor disputes, but only
for consumer boycotts; thus, Safeco317 but not L,4 3 18 should be over-
ruled. He argues that consumer boycotts closely resemble voting be-
cause consumer power is diffuse. By contrast, "individuals as
producers and owners of capital have specialized and very unequal
market power. By threatening to withhold their services or capital,
some indivduals can exert disproportionate leverage over important so-
cial decisions. ' 319 Hence, in this view producer boycotts should remain
outside the zone of constitutional protection.
Harper's approach, if applied to the general problem of economic
and political power, would protect those forms of economic power that
resemble voting power in that they are spread among a large number of
individuals. It would seek to expand rights of economic participation
313. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
314. Political theorists have long argued that the prevention of corruption in the political
system requires rough equality in the economic system. See Parker, The Past of Constitu-
tional Theory--and Its Future, supra note 65, at 256. The impossibility of separating the
political and economic systems has prompted one commentator to suggest that the best way
to insure equality under the First Amendment is to work for the overall equalization of
wealth. See Powe, Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 243,
282-83.
315. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware and Its Implicationsfor .4merican Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409 (1984).
316. 458 U.S. 886 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 209-15).
317. 447 U.S. 607 (1980) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 185-96).
318. 460 U.S. 212 (1982) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 219-26).
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while retaining controls on concentrated economic power. This ap-
proach has much to recommend it. As Harper points out, the direct
exercise of dispersed economic power can be an effective form of dem-
ocratic participation.320 And, on the other hand, the political use of
concentrated economic power poses serious dangers to democracy.
Unfortunately, continued nonprotection of employee producer
boycotts would preserve a gross imbalance in the access of capital and
labor to that potent form of power. In Harper's view, nonprotection of
employees' rights to use producer power is balanced by similar nonpro-
tection of business rights to employ such power. Yet, formally
equivalent nonprotection only obscures the systematic bias that results
from denying protection to employee boycotts.
At present, business enterprises are free to use their power as pro-
ducers to influence governmental action.321 Indeed, nothing is more
common than threats by businesses to move their productive capital
out of a state or locality unless the "business climate"-that is, the reg-
ulatory and tax system-is improved. Even within the labor context,
there are few restrictions on the withholding of productive capital. An
employer is free to close its entire business for any reason.322 Partial
closings are not prohibited unless motivated by anti-union animus. 323
Only "lockouts," temporary closings in connection with labor disputes,
are effectively restricted. Given the increasing mobility of capital, how-
ever, even this restraint is quickly losing its significance. Employers
can accomplish similar results by closing or partially closing facilities
in one area and transferring productive capacity to another. The work-
ers in the new locality will not be the same individuals who have re-
ceived the lesson of the closing, but-given the frequency of
shutdowns--employers can select a new locality where the workers al-
ready have been subjected to similar closings by other employers.324
In short, formally equivalent nonprotection permits the state to
shackle employees' use of producer power while allowing the untram-
melled exercise of corporate producer power. In the functional view,
this imbalance would not create a constitutional problem if the regula-
tion of producer power could safely be left to the political process.
320. Id. at 422-23.
321. See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645-60,
304 N.W.2d 455, 464-71 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (General Motors pressured the City of
Detroit into condemning a neighborhood to provide space for an assembly complex).
322. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1965).
323. Id. at 274-75.
324. See generally B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA (1982).
Harper's own rationale for nonprotection, however, belies that possibil-
ity. He argues that producer power may be restricted not because it is
politically insignificant or harmless, but because it is a dangerous and
potent form of power-indeed, far more potent than the relatively dif-
fuse consumer power. Selective constraints on the use of a politically
potent form of power pose obvious constitutional problems for the
functional theories of the First Amendment, which rely upon a fair
process to legitimate legislative outcomes. Hence, the contradiction be-
tween the labor black hole and the functional vision of the First
Amendment cannot be resolved short of constitutional protection for
employee producer boycotts, as well as more dispersed forms of eco-
nomic power.
Conclusion
In the end, .. in the long distant end-and always assum-
ing that things will continue to move in the direction in which
they now seem to be moving, we might decide that the universe
will consist of black holes only-and finally, perhaps, into one
black hole containing everything. The entire universe will have
collapsed.3'
The three-systems ladder has an air of value neutrality about it.
Within each system, speakers and viewpoints are treated equally.326
But the boundaries of the systems are set to ensure that the expressive
activities most vital to corporate power-the purchase of political voice
and the commercial advertisement of products-receive heightened
protection. The principal exception to this generalization is the Court's
continued solicitude for civil rights protests without regard to which of
the three systems is involved.
As this Article demonstrates, the Court has selectively breached
the liberal cordon sanitaire between the political and economic systems.
The best prospect for rectifying the resulting inequality lies not in the
contraction of protection for corporate expression, but in the expansion
of protection to cover the expressive activities of workers and labor or-
ganizations, the main counterweights to corporate power.
Over forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that "[flree
discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of la-
bor disputes [is] indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the
processes of popular govenment to shape the destiny of modem indus-
325. 1. AsIMov, THE COLLAPSING UNIVERSE 152 (1977).
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trial society."32 In light of structural changes in the organization of
capital over the past several decades, that observation is doubly true
today. The increasing mobility of capital is breaking down the legally-
imposed privatization of labor-management relations. Professors
Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison have argued convincingly that
industrial plant closings and reopenings are tearing apart the fabric of
society. 328 The resulting conflicts are shifting from the collective bar-
gaining process to the political process. Corporations are openly using
the threat of disinvestment to pressure local government into political
concessions. 329 Unions are uniting with church groups and community
associations to preserve their communities.33 ° Furthermore, the in-
creasing dependence of private industry on government contracts is
blurring the distinction between political and economic labor activ-
ity.33' In short, the contention that labor expression does not embrace
"matters of public concern" no longer stands the test of reality.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court is not likely to dispense with the
three-systems ladder in the near future. However, state courts and
lower federal courts may be receptive to the argument that the expan-
sion of protection for the expressive activities of corporations and civil
rights protestors has undermined the justifications for denying similar
protection to workers and unions.3 32 State courts possess the power to
provide protection for labor expression outside the zone of federal pre-
emption- most notably in cases involving the expressive activities of
state and local government workers. And, federal district courts enjoy
a wide range of discretion in handling labor expression, particularly in
the critical area of labor injunctions.333 For the forseeable future, the
most effective legal criticism of the labor black hole may be advanced
in those forums.
327. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
328. See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 324.
329. See supra note 321.
330. See B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra note 324, at 238-39. In one instance, a
combined union-church-community picket line convinced the mayor of a small city to order
a plant shut down in protest against a productivity push by management. Id. at 169-70.
331. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that collective bargaining is gradually be-
ing displaced by political activity aimed at executive contracting officials and the legislative
branch of government. See Hyde, Beyond Collective Bargaining: The Politicization ofLabor
Relations Under Government Contract, 1982 WIs. L. REV. 1, 41.
332. The California Supreme Court recently hinted that it might be receptive to this
approach. See Environmental Planning & Information Council v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
3d 188, 198 n.9 (1984).
333. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners, 442 F.2d 1261, 1264 ( 4th
Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971).
